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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays. Using firm-level data from Korea, the first and
second chapter examine Korean firms’ offshoring strategies and the impact of these offshoring
activities on firm-level employment in Korea. In the third chapter, the recent pattern of
wage inequality is decomposed using an individual-level Korean labor income survey. This
dissertation finds the role of industry capital intensity and firm productivity in the differential
choices of global sourcing such as vertical FDI and foreign outsourcing. Also, this dissertation
finds that input substitutability and firm exports can affect the impact of offshoring on firms’
domestic labor demand. Finally, this dissertation finds various workers’ characteristics that
have affected wage inequality across various quartiles.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Global fragmentation of production in the form of multinational corporations and foreign
outsourcing is commonly observed these days, and has had an enormous impact on patterns
in the world volume of trade. Accordingly, this global sourcing, so-called “offshoring”, has
been conjectured to affect the labor market in various ways. Through this dissertation, I
first explore firm-level offshoring behavior and then examine how it is linked to firm-level
labor demand. Also, I study another important issue of labor market outcome - namely,
wage inequality - which constitutes a first step towards more extensive understanding of
how globalization, including offshoring, has been affecting income inequality across workers.
In the first chapter, firms’ different global sourcing strategies are investigated. Firms’
types of intermediate input sourcing strategy - i.e., firm boundary - are often classified into
four categories: domestic vertical integration, foreign vertical integration (FDI), domestic
outsourcing, and foreign outsourcing. Understanding the systematic factors that drive firms’
optimal choice of one of these organizations is important to gain a better understanding of the
global firms that are likely to change the structure of the world volume of trade. My empirical
hypotheses on firm organization are based on two benchmark models of the property rights
literature in the field of international trade. Due to the fixed cost of offshoring and the
contract incompleteness that commonly exists in intermediate input production, property
rights models indicate that capital intensity and firm productivity are two key elements
affecting the choice of firm organization. Using Korean firm-level panel data and various
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econometric identifications with a special focus on causality, I provide more robust empirical
support for the predictions of the property rights models. First, it is found that the preference
for vertical integration increases with industry capital intensity. Firm-level productivity is
confirmed as the key determinant of the type of global sourcing that is chosen. With greater
capital intensity, higher productivity leading to offshoring moves firms toward vertical FDI
rather than foreign outsourcing. The empirical result on firms’ dynamic sourcing behavior
further strengthens other findings and provides further support for the predictions of the
property rights models.
The second chapter, co-authored with Devashish Mitra and Priya Ranjan, examines the
relationship between offshoring and firm-level domestic employment. Politicians and the
media have blamed offshoring for high unemployment rates, and this issue still remains
controversial among trade economists. In this paper, we first develop a small country model
of offshoring, as an extension of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2013), and using firm-
level data from Korea, we then empirically investigate the model’s implications in regard
to offshoring, exports, and employment at the firm level. We first find that input and
output trade cost reductions increase both firm-level exports and imports at both intensive
and extensive margins, which also validate our trade cost measurement. This paper also
finds that the average impact of the input trade cost on firm employment can switch from
positive to negative depending on the average input substitutability or complementarity,
which is a crucial condition for whether the cost reduction from offshoring induces a labor
demand increase or decrease. Our results also confirm a new channel of positive offshoring
impact on domestic employment, namely, expansion of offshoring firms’ exporting. These
results are fairly robust to specification, including instrumental variables estimation and
propensity score matching with difference-in-difference estimation, which could effectively
handle potential endogeneity issues between offshoring and firm-level employment.
In my third chapter, co-authored with Pallab Ghosh, we closely examine the pattern
of wage inequality in Korea during 1998-2007. The issue of income inequality (or income
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polarization) has recently been a major concern among many countries, including South
Korea. Also, patterns of wage inequality vary widely across different countries (e.g., US vs.
France). This study of the case of South Korea provides a meaningful contribution to the
literature in that South Korea was one of the few countries to experience high economic
growth and decreasing wage inequality from the 1980s to mid 90s; however, South Korea is
now ranked second among the OECD countries when it comes to the rate of rise in inequality.
Also, this inequality has purportedly been exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis in the
late 1990s.
Previous studies have found possible contributing factors to wage inequality from mean-
based estimations. Due to the fact that the pattern of income inequality has varied across
various income levels, we apply Machado and Matas decomposition (2005), which allows us
to decompose the changes in the wage density into the composition effect, wage structure
effect and residual effect. This method also allows a counterfactual exercise for computing
the contributions of individual factors. By comparing our estimated wage density function
between 1998 and 2007, we could first observe that the middle class has been shrinking
(i.e., polarization). Also, one of our major findings indicates that an increase in education
significantly affected the gap between the high-income class and the middle class, which
supports the SBTC hypothesis. Furthermore, we found no significant effect of labor union
on the wage gap between the middle class and low-income class, suggesting a weak role of
the Korean labor union in wage redistribution. This study, as a thorough investigation of
wage inequality patterns through advanced methods, would be a meaningful basis for the
empirical exploration of the role of offshoring on wage inequality, which has been known since
the work of Feenstra and Hanson (1997) to increase the relative wages of skilled workers in
both offshoring and host countries.
3
CHAPTER II
Firm Boundaries and Global Sourcing : Evidence from
South Korea
2.1 Introduction
Global fragmentation of production, which often takes the form of multinational corpo-
rations, is commonly observed these days. In 2000, US intra-firm trade accounted for 46% of
total imports (Bernard et al., 2010). Also, 35% of world trade in 2001 was conducted within
the network of multinationals (UNCTAD, 2002; Helpman, 2006). Reflecting the growing im-
portance of global sourcing in the domestic economy, fear of offshoring led to the enactment
of anti-offshoring laws in the United States such as the Bring Jobs Home Act in 2012.
There have also been various types of production fragmentation. Intel’s manufacturing
is done solely in its own manufacturing plants all around the world, while almost all Nike
products are manufactured in Asian factories that are owned by subcontractors. Literature
on global sourcing more formally classifies the boundaries of firms according to the type of
input sourcing. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, if a headquarter firm owns a subsidiary to acquire
intermediate inputs, that is called ‘vertical integration’, ‘in-house production’ or ‘intra-firm
trade’. With outsourcing, on the other hand, intermediate inputs are obtained from indepen-
dent suppliers through subcontracting. Within the same ownership choice, firm boundaries
can be further segmented by sourcing locations. Multinational corporations that mostly
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source from foreign affiliates are standard examples of vertical foreign direct investment
(FDI) firms, whereas foreign outsourcers mainly acquire inputs from foreign independent
providers. ‘Offshoring’ is term that encompasses both FDI and foreign outsourcing.
Relationship-specific investments are also a common phenomenon. That is, both headquarter-
provided inputs and supplier’s inputs are combined in production such that a well-maintained
relationship becomes crucial. Antra`s (2003) mentions a study by Dunning (1993) which
shows that the cost of capital investments for intermediate input production such as ma-
chinery is often shared between two firms. According to the survey on the global sourc-
ing strategy conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2008, the single biggest concern for
global firms about future sourcing was input quality control. Accordingly, they planned to
invest more in managerial effort associated with input customization. Due to vendor non-
performance, a significant portion of multinational firms replaced outsourcing with in-house
sourcing to reduce potential risks in their joint manufacturing process (Deloitte, 2012).
This paper empirically explores why global firms engage differently in production frag-
mentation. Drawing empirical implications from the property rights models that explain
different sourcing behaviors in an environment of relationship-specific production and con-
tract incompleteness, this study aims to identify the key factors affecting the ownership
choice (vertical integration vs. outsourcing), global sourcing (or offshoring), and choices
between vertical FDI and foreign outsourcing.
According to the model proposed by Antra`s (2003), the relative importance of headquar-
ters or the supplier in joint production determines a firm’s ownership choice, because the
effort of the more important player would contribute more to joint surplus. Thus, if joint
production relies more on the headquarter input such that the consideration of supplier’s
suboptimal effort is relatively unimportant, the optimal option for headquarters would be
vertical integration as that would provide headquarters with a greater revenue share of the
joint surplus. In Antra`s and Helpman (2004), differences in fixed costs across the four or-
ganizational choices can make the Antra`s (2003) effect not always hold. Thus, even under
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greater headquarter importance, foreign outsourcing could be an optimal choice for lower-
productivity firms that cannot afford the fixed cost of vertical integration. FDI would be
the choice for the most productive firms.
Using Korean firm-level panel data, this paper finds that the likelihood of firms acquiring
inputs mostly from related parties (vertical integration) is positively related with indus-
try capital intensity, which can effectively capture the importance of headquarter activity.
Also, estimation results show that higher firm-level productivity induces the foreign making
decision (FDI) against the foreign buying choice (outsourcing) in industries that are more
capital-intensive. In those that are less capital-intensive, a different pattern is observed in
that higher productivity would induce firms to become a foreign outsourcer. Firm-level pro-
ductivity is also estimated to increase the probability of offshoring, regardless of industry
capital intensity. Additionally, it is found out that domestic outsourcing firms also resort to
vertical FDI as a result of an increase in productivity.
The results of this paper are in line with the main predictions of Antra`s (2003) and
Antra`s and Helpman (2004). Although these property rights models have generated empir-
ically testable implications regarding the volume of trade, mark-up and welfare, empirical
validations hardly exist possibly due to data limitations. Also, most existing firm-level empir-
ical studies have analyzed the sourcing behaviors of European firms. This paper contributes
to the further development of the property rights literature by providing empirical evidence
for the case of South Korea.
The observed prevalence of global fragmentation or intrafirm trade cannot be explained
by studies of horizontal FDI, which are driven mainly by the foreign market access motive.
According to Antra`s and Yeaple (2014), traditional FDI theories have not yet provided
complete models in that they fail to explain the different choices of multinational corporations
regarding foreign production.
Among the approaches to analyzing firm boundaries, the transaction cost approach as-
sumes that transaction costs are reduced by integration in contrast to contracting out to
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other firms (outsourcing), while property rights models specify equally important transac-
tion cost within firm boundaries. Accordingly, in the context of the transaction cost model,
the greater prevalence of outsourcing in the United States relative to Korea and Japan is
explained by the greater market competition in the United States (Grossman & Helpman,
2002). The results of this paper which are in line with the property rights models of Antra`s
(2003) and Antra`s and Helpman (2004), provide another interpretation namely, that the
goal of securing higher bargaining power through ownership affects the different sourcing
mode choices of Korean firms.
Lastly, this empirical evidence of property rights models would not be limited to the case
of Korean firms. A feature of South Korean FDI (including vertical and horizontal FDI) is
that the amount of outward FDI is slightly higher than that of inward FDI. That is, Korea is
open to foreign direct investment at both direction. According to OECD resport, the average
ratio of FDI inward stock to GDP from 2009 to 2013 is 13.4% and outbound FDI ratio is
15.9%. A similar FDI behavior is found among the small open economies in OECD member
countries including Austria, Canada, Greece, Israel, Italy and Norway, which permits to
understand the results of this paper in more glabal context.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I briefly review previous empirical work
on firm boundary choices based on property rights models. In Section 2.3, the hypotheses
drawn from the reference models are introduced. In Section 2.4, the data source and binary
dependent variable construction are described. In Section 2.5, estimation strategies and
results are provided. Robustness checks for selected results with different sourcing definition
is provided in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 summarizes the research and provides limitations and
possible development.
2.2 Related Literature
Earlier empirical studies on the determinants of firm organization are based on product-
and industry-level data for the case of the United States. Focusing mostly on the share of
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intra-firm imports in total imports, the prevalence of intra-firm imports was found to be
positively associated with capital intensity and R&D intensity (Antra`s, 2003, Yeaple, 2006),
and capital and skill intensity (Nunn & Trefler, 2008; Bernard et al., 2010), and all capital,
R&D, and skill intensity (Nunn & Trefler, 2013). Also, it was found that industries where
capital intensity is high and productivity is more dispersed have a larger share of intra-firm
imports (Nunn & Trefler, 2008; 2013).
Firm-level data with sourcing information has been relatively scarce. Based on 1999
Japanese manufacturing data, Tomiura (2007) found non-econometric evidence that high-
productivity firms resort to FDI rather than outsourcing. Defever and Toubal (2007; 2012),
using a 1999 French multinational company dataset, found a systematic relationship among
outsourcing, higher productivity, and direct measure of the firm-level relationship-specific
input intensity.1 Corcos et al. (2013) used the same French data but took the sample
selection bias into account by combining external customs data. They found that firm-level
capital intensity, productivity and judicial institutions are key determinants of product-level
trade with related parties. Kohler and Smolka (2012) examined sourcing premia by analyzing
a Spanish panel dataset from 2006 to 2008, and found that the productivity of FDI firms are
the highest among the four types of firms. By using 1998 Italian firm-level data, Federico
(2012) also found support for predictions of property rights models: capital intensity and
productivity are determinants of domestic and foreign integration decisions.
This paper is distinct from previous works in several ways. First, the analysis is based
on panel data so that the unobserved firm heterogeneity is suitably controlled through fixed-
effect estimation, which is missing from the studies based on industry-level data and firm-
level cross-sectional data.2 Also, panel data analysis makes it possible to take into account
potential endogeneity bias in the choice of firm organization and to examine changes in
sourcing mode with productivity growth. Second, unlike previous studies that look into the
1This opposite result to the A&H (2004) prediction is due to the opposite assumption of the fixed-cost
ordering.
2Kohler and Smolka (2012) is based on Spanish panel dataset; however, inferences are drawn from a
population average estimator.
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sourcing participation behavior, this paper focuses more on the main sourcing behavior for
each, which I believe is in line empirical counterpart of the optimal sourcing mode.3
2.3 Hypotheses on Firm Organization
2.3.1 Ownership Choice
To examine the ownership choice between vertically integrated sourcing and outsourcing,
my hypothesis is drawn from the Antra`s (2003) model. According to this model, the final
good producer (i.e., the headquarter firm) makes relationship-specific investment with the
input supplier. Each partys true level of effort (or investment) is not observable or verifiable.
Due to the greater outside option of having property rights, headquarters generally takes a
greater revenue share under integration. If one party expects that the other would receive
a greater revenue share (ex post), then that party would have an incentive to underinvest
(ex ante). To reduce this hold-up inefficiency arising from incompleteness of contract, the
choice of organization is dictated by the relative importance of headquarters and the input
supplier. Therefore, allowing a greater revenue share to the intermediate input supplier
through outsourcing is optimal when the marginal return on supplier investment is higher.
Similarly, headquarter should be given a higher revenue share through vertical integration
if headquarter investment would increase the joint surplus more than investment by the
intermediate input supplier. Based on this theoretical framework, the following testable
implication can be drawn:
• Hypothesis 1 : Vertically integrated sourcing is more likely to be chosen as industry
capital intensity increases. Additionally, this prediction would be independent of the
location choice (i.e., foreign or domestic sourcing).
3Kohler and Smolka (2012) also looked into the main sourcing choice behavior but not within the context
of property rights models.
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Hypothesis 1 assumes that the relative importance of headquarter-provided input in the
joint production is captured by industry-level capital intensity. As mentioned earlier, Antra`s
(2003) provides detailed evidence that the cost of capital investment is more commonly
shared between the headquarter and input suppliers than the cost of labor. This premise
has also been empirically supported by most previous studies. Although Antra`s (2003) deals
with ownership choice between two sourcing modes (vertical integration vs. outsourcing)
without consideration of location choice, this paper additionally investigates whether capital
intensity plays a role in the choice among all four sourcing modes.
2.3.2 The Role of Productivity
The second hypothesis on the role of firm-level productivity is drawn from Antra`s and
Helpman (2004), which introduces productivity heterogeneity and fixed-cost differences across
different organization choices. From Antra`s (2003), the profit-maximizing choice of head-
quarters in lower-capital-intensity industries is outsourcing, all else held equal; however, here,
the fixed cost is assumed to be lower with outsourcing than with vertical integration. Thus,
outsourcing is obviously the dominating choice in the relatively low-capital-intensity indus-
tries. Now, productivity determines whether to buy inputs from a foreign subcontractor or
domestic independent supplier. Finding a foreign supplier would incur more cost (fixed cost),
but inputs would be cheaper due to the lower variable cost in the foreign country. Thus, the
more productive firms that can afford the fixed cost for the variable cost saving from foreign
production are more likely to be foreign outsourcers. This is summarized in Figure 2.2 (left
panel).
In relatively capital-intensive industries, vertically integrated sourcing is optimal accord-
ing to Antra`s (2003). Unlike the case of lower-capital-intensity industries, the final good
producer would face a trade-off due to the greater fixed cost of vertical integration. Thus,
high-productivity firms capable of bearing that fixed cost would optimally choose vertical in-
tegration, while others would decide to buy. That is, given the location choice (i.e., whether
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it is foreign or domestic), vertical integration would be positively associated with higher
productivity. Another fixed cost between foreign versus domestic will determine location
choice. Again, foreign sourcing (offshoring) will be selected by high-productivity firms. This
is summarized in Figure 2.2 (right panel).
The equilibrium pattern of firm organization illustrated in Figure 2.2 is the benchmark
prediction of Antra`s and Helpman (2004). That is, depending on the imposed fixed-cost
assumption and the magnitude of the gap between the foreign and domestic variable costs,
some options would be dominated by others. Only the prediction on the FDI choice in
high-capital-intensity industries and the prediction of the foreign outsourcing choice in low-
capital-intensity industries are not sensitive to the model parameters. Thus, we have the
second proposition as follows:
• Hypothesis 2 : The likelihood of choosing foreign vertical integration (FDI) is pos-
itively associated with total factor productivity in capital-intensive industries. Also,
foreign outsourcing is more likely to be chosen with a productivity increase in less-
capital-intensive industries. Combining these two statements, there should be a pos-
itive productivity effect on the likelihood of offshoring regardless of industry capital
intensity.
2.3.3 Dynamic Behavior
Taking advantage of panel data, the dynamics of the sourcing mode can also be ana-
lyzed. Based on Figure 2.2, domestic outsourcing is a viable sourcing mode in both types of
industries for low-productivity firms. If this prediction holds over time, then we can expect
that FDI would also be an available option for already participating domestic outsourcing
firms as the productivity increases. Whether this dynamic behavior along the productivity
increases interacts with industry capital intensity is an empirical question. Thus, another
testable hypothesis can be drawn as follows:
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• Hypothesis 3: An increase in productivity could lead to the first-time FDI partici-
pation of domestic outsourcing firms.
2.4 Data and Sourcing Variables
2.4.1 Data Source
The dataset used for this research is drawn from the Korean firm-level panel, The Survey
of Business Activity, from 2006 to 2010. This annual survey conducted by Statistics Korea
covers all firms with more than 0.3 million (in USD) of capital stock and 50 regular workers
across all industries. Sourcing information, such as the amount of outsourcing and intra-
firm trade, can be found along with balance sheet information. According to the published
manual, the sales from this survey are 80% of those from the Korea Industrial Productivity
(KIP) database in 2007. That is, the sample firms selected are quite representative of firms
in Korea.
The estimation mainly focuses on manufacturing which consists of 82 (3-digit) industries.
After removing invalid observations where the amount of outsourcing or intrafirm trade was
greater than total operating cost, the sample consisted of 7,298 firms and 27,499 observations.
In the estimation, firms owned by parent firms (where at least 50% of stock share was owned
by other firms), were excluded in order to focus on the behavior of true headquarter firms.4
Ultimately, the target sample consisted of 23,389 observations.
2.4.2 Dependent Variables Construction
In this section, I describe the continuous sourcing variables in the raw data and the
method I use to transform them into binary variables that will be used as dependent variables
in the main analysis.
4According to Nunn and Trefler (2013), the behavior of firms owned by parent firms differed significantly
from those of true headquarter firms.
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2.4.2.1 Latent Sourcing Variable
Two types of sourcing information were extracted from the data: the value of intra-firm
trade and the total value of subcontracting. The definition of intra-firm trade is the amount
of import and domestic purchase from affiliates who own at least 20% stock share. Subcon-
tracting value consists of subcontracting amount from affiliates and from unrelated parties.
To be in line with the theoretical framework that classifies firm boundaries by ownership,
I define the sum of intra-firm trade and subcontracting from affiliates as the total amount
of vertically integrated sourcing. Then, subcontracting with unrelated parties is defined as
the total amount of outsourcing. Unlike most previous studies, this study does not use the
amount of arms-length trade as a measurement of outsourcing since the subcontracting of
unrelated parties seems to represent the concept of outsourcing more directly.
Finally, the two generated vertical integration and outsourcing variables are decomposed
by the origin of inputs: whether inputs are obtained domestically or from abroad. That is,
the sum of intra-firm import and subcontracting with foreign affiliates constitute the total
amount of vertical FDI. Also, the total amount of foreign outsourcing (FO) is the total
subcontracting cost with foreign unrelated parties. Using the domestic counterpart, the
amount of domestic integration (DI) and domestic outsourcing (DO) are similarly generated.
2.4.2.2 Binary Dependent Variable
One of four organization choices (FDI, FO, DI, DO)5 is assigned to each firm-year ob-
servation by using continuous sourcing variables; however, this process is not as simple as
it seems due to the multiple sourcing behaviors in the real world. That is, many firm-year
observations contain a positive amount of multiple sourcing modes. So, if a firm is involved
in FDI and domestic outsourcing in the same year, then it is not obvious whether this firm
should be regarded as an FDI or DO firm that year. Figure 2.3 illustrates this prevalence of
5FDI denotes the vertical foreign direct investment, FO denotes the foreign outsourcing, DI denotes
domestic vertical integration, and DO denotes domestic outsourcing.
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multiple sourcing activities found in the sample. The first thing to notice is that very few
observations show a single sourcing strategy. Except for pure domestic outsourcing, the sum
of pure domestic vertical integration, pure FDI, and pure foreign outsourcing observations
account for only 4% of total observations. About 16% of observations show two sourcing
strategies, while triple sourcing strategies account for 4%. Finally, about 0.9% of the obser-
vations contain positive amounts of all four sourcing modes.6 The remaining observations
are domestic firms with no outsourcing or offshoring of any kind.
To solve this complexity, the binary dependent variable indicating one of four firm bound-
aries is constructed in one of two ways: by mutually exclusive (main sourcing) criteria or by
mutually inclusive (participation) criteria. Figure 2.4 summarizes the results of this binary
dependent variable construction.
In the left panel of Figure 2.4, firm boundaries are defined based on its main sourcing
choice among the four alternatives. For example, an observation i at time t is assigned to
FDI as :
yit = 1, ifFDIit = max[DIit, DOit, FDIit, FOit], and yit = 0, otherwise
Likewise, the same rule is applied to assign the other organization choices (FO, DI, and DO).
The right panel of Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of observations on the dependent
variable constructed by the participation criterion. For example, the FDI binary dependent
variable using the participation criterion is constructed as follows:
yit = 1, ifFDIit > 0, and yit = 0, otherwise
Of the two types of binary dependent variables, the main sourcing variable is closer in
6The ratio of foreign outsourcing is very small in the data in contrast to previous studies which found
that foreign outsourcing is a more common practice than integrated sourcing. This is due to the different
definitions of outsourcing: unrelated party subcontract sourcing vs. arms-length trade.
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spirit to theories that examine the equilibrium choice of firm organization. For this reason,
my main estimations will use the main choice as the dependent variable. The participation
variable is additionally used as a robustness check.7
An interesting pattern demonstrated in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 is that a relatively small
proportion of Korean manufacturing firms is involved in offshoring activity (13% of total
observations). Within offshoring, FDI (11%) is more prevalent than foreign outsourcing
(4%). Comparing studies that use similar definitions of outsourcing and intra-firm imports,
only 5% of Japanese firms in 1998 were involved in global sourcing (Tomiura, 2007); in Spain,
however, almost 40% of firms resorted to offshoring (Kohler & Smolka, 2011).
2.5 Estimation and the Results
2.5.1 Hypothesis 1
2.5.1.1 Estimation Method
Equation (2.1) is the econometric specification of Hypothesis 1 in Section 2.3.1.
Pr(yit = 1) = Λ(βCAPit +X
′
itδ + µi) + vit (2.1)
Here, yit is the binary dependent variable either for vertical integration or outsourcing. The
vertical integration binary variable is defined by combining the constructed FDI main choice
and domestic integration choice (DI) binary variable shown in Figure 2.4. Additionally,
each FDI and DI choice variable is used separately as a dependent variable. Likewise, the
outsourcing binary dependent variable includes both domestic (DO) and foreign outsourcing
7Instead of discrete variable transformation, using a continuous sourcing variable - i.e., a proportion of
each sourcing mode within a firm’s total amount of sourcing seems to handle the multiple sourcing practice
in the data; however, the focus of this paper is sourcing behavior at an extensive margin that often requires
a significant amount of changes in sourcing amount. For this reason, transformed binary dependent variables
are mainly used in the estimation.
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(FO) main choice, and each outsourcing choice is also regressed along the lines of Equation
(2.1).
The key regressor, CAPit, is the capital intensity of the industry to which the firm belongs,
and is defined as the ratio of industry physical capital (tangible asset) to total wage bill. As
explained earlier, this capital intensity aims to capture the relative importance of headquarter
input in the joint production. Instead of firm-level, industry-level capital intensity is adopted
following Antra`s (2003). In addition, this works around the issue of reverse causality.8 To
check robustness, other industry-level intensities possibly related with headquarter activity
are included as well. Following the literature, these are R&D intensity (ratio of total R&D
expenditure to total sales) and advertising cost intensity (ratio of total advertisement cost
to total sales). Instead of skill intensity or human capital intensity, which are used in the
existing literature, this paper introduces a new measure i.e., management intensity (the ratio
of total headquarter workers in management operation to the total number of workers).
In some specifications, another firm-level regressor i.e., firm size (total employment), is
included as well.9 All RHS variables are transformed into logarithms in order to minimize
the sensitivity of my regression results to outlying observations. Finally, Equation (2.1) is
estimated by a fixed-effects conditional logit estimator.
2.5.1.2 Estimation Results
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics for all explanatory variables used in this paper. From
the table, we can see enough within variation of capital intensity to identify Equation (2.1).10
Within variations in other industry-level intensities are approximately one-third or two-third
of the between variation.
8Corcos et al. (2012) found that firm-level capital intensity also determines intrafirm-trade participation;
however, I think that using firm-level capital intensity opens the possibility of endogeneity bias in this case.
9From Table 1, we can see that the within variation of firm size is very small relative to the between
variation. Thus, firm size in this case could be a proper firm-level control.
10According to Kims (2013) study that calculates the capital intensity in Korea over the past 20 years
from the Mining and Manufacturing Survey, the capital intensities of Korean industries increased 20% during
2006-2009, which is consistent with the pattern found here.
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Table 2.2 provides estimation results pertaining to Equation (2.1). Columns 2-4 contain
results related to the choice between vertical integration and outsourcing choice estimation.
From the results in the first row (i.e., estimation without firm controls), we can see that
higher capital intensity increases the likelihood of all types of vertical integration choices and
decreases outsourcing choice probabilities (except for foreign outsourcing). Within vertical
integration, the impact of capital intensity is larger on the choice of foreign direct investment
(FDI) than on domestic integration (DI). Among the outsourcing choices, the effect of capital
intensity on domestic outsourcing (DO) seems to dominate. Also, these estimated effects of
capital intensity are not sensitive to the inclusion of firm-level controls (second row).
Table 2.3 shows estimation results with additional industry-level intensities.11 First, when
domestic and foreign choice are combined (columns 2 and 5), capital intensity still affects the
ownership choice differently, which is evident in the opposite signs of capital intensity effect
estimates between vertical integration estimation (column 2) and outsourcing estimation
(column 5). The effects of management intensity and R&D intensity are partially consistent
with that of capital intensity. The greater the share of management workers, the lower
the likelihood of outsourcing; furthermore, the greater the R&D intensity, the higher the
probability of vertical integration. The effect of advertising cost intensity, however, turns
out to decrease the likelihood of being mainly a vertical integration firm, which is opposite
to the expected sign.
Columns 3 and 6 compare the effects of industry intensities on the foreign ownership
choices. Although no statistically significant effect can be found from foreign outsourcing
regression, capital intensity still has a positive effect on the likelihood of being a mainly
FDI firm. The last columns of each block (columns 4 and 7) compare different patterns
within domestic sourcing modes. These results support the predictions of Antra`s (2003): the
positive effect of capital intensity on domestic vertical integration and the negative effects of
capital and management intensity on domestic outsourcing. No other statistically significant
11The same firm control (i.e., firm size) is included. Estimation results without firm control are still the
same, but they are not provided in order to save space.
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effects against the model are estimated. Combining results from Tables 2.2 and 2.3, firms’
integration choices are estimated as highly related with industry capital intensity, which
is consistent with our first hypothesis. Management intensity and R&D intensity are also
important.12 And these firm-level estimation results confirm findings from previous studies
based on industry data.
2.5.2 Hypothesis 2
2.5.2.1 Estimation Methods
Estimation Equation (2.2) is specified for Hypothesis 2 in Section 2.3.2.
Pr(yit) = Λ(β
jTFPit +X
′
itδ
j + µi) + vit j = H,L (2.2)
Here, yit is a binary dependent variable either for FDI choice, foreign outsourcing (FO)
choice or offshoring choice. The offshoring binary variable is constructed by combining FDI
and foreign outsourcing (FO) binary variables. The key regressor is firm-level total factor
productivity, TFPit, which is estimated by the Levinsohn-Petrin semiparametric method
and is a standard technique in the literature.13 Assuming common production technology
for each 2-digit industry, total factor productivity is obtained after estimating value-added
form production function.
According to Hypothesis 2, the effect of productivity is expected to differ by industry
type, so Equation (2.2) is estimated separately for each sub-sample. The sample is split
based on industry capital intensity. This is done to test whether the effect of productivity
on the firm’s organization decision varies by level of headquarter importance. A high-capital-
intensity industry here (j = H) is defined as one with a five-year average capital intensity
12The inclusion of year FE effect makes all the industry-level intensities statistically insignificant. The
inclusion of time dummy variables might absorb too much within variations in the industry-level variables.
To check for this, a random effect estimation was performed and the same effects shown in Tables 2.2 and
2.3 were found. Also, RE results are not sensitive to the inclusion of year FEs.
13The Olley-Pakes method was also applied to construct TFPs, as it has a high correlation, 0.8, with the
Levinshon Petrin TFP. This paper mainly uses LP productivity.
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above the mean, median, or 75th percentile. Also, a low-capital-intensity industry (j = L) is
one with a capital intensity below the mean, median or 25th percentile. As before, Equation
(2.2) is estimated by fixed effects conditional logit.
2.5.2.2 Issue on Endogeneity bias
Endogeneity bias may arise from the possible correlation between productivity and the
error term in Equation (2.2). For example, higher productivity can increase the amount
of FDI as well as other types of sourcing. Then, changes in other sourcing amounts can
affect the probability of being a FDI firm. Also, there would be reverse causation from
FDI to productivity. So, the included RHS variable, TFP, could be correlated with the
error term. If the productivity is correlated only with the unobservable time-invariant firm
heterogeneity term, µi, then potential endogeneity bias can be controlled by fixed-effect
estimation; however, the estimation would suffer from endogeneity bias when productivity
is correlated with the idiosyncratic error component, vit. To control for this possibility, an
IV estimation is conducted.
Since the baseline estimation equation is non-linear, instead of the conventional IV tech-
nique, a control function approach (which is flexible to functional form) is adopted. As an
instrumental variable for the contemporaneous TFP, the first lag of TFP is used. This is
a valid instrumental variable for the following reasons. First, it is evident that the lag of
TFP is correlated with the current TFP. Second, when the first lag of TFP is included in
the original estimation equation (in addition to current TFP), no lagged productivity effect
is found. That is, the first lag of TFP affects the sourcing decision only through the cur-
rent TFP. One might think this counterintuitive based on the fact that FDI usually takes
time to begin; however, the dependent variable here is the binary variable that indicates
the maximum sourcing type. In this case, the productivity shock in 2006 could affect the
amount of foreign direct investment in 2008, but not be large enough to make the amount
the maximum out of all modes.
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Using an instrumental variable, a two-step estimation is performed. In the first stage
(Equation (2.3)), the current TFP is regressed on the first lag of TFP and the same included
RHS variable. Since this first-stage regression is a dynamic model, Arellano and Bond
two-step GMM estimation is applied to obtain consistent coefficients. In the second stage
(Equation (2.4)), the residuals obtained from the first-stage estimation are included to control
for the potential endogeneity bias. Standard errors throughout this paper are obtained by
bootstrapping with 399 replications.
First Stage : TFPit = ρTFPi,t−1 +X ′itη + uit (2.3)
Second Stage : Pr(yit) = Λ(β
jTFPit +X
′
itδ
j + γj eˆit + µi) + vit, j = H,L (2.4)
2.5.2.3 Results : FDI choice
Table 2.4 shows the estimation result of Equations (2.2) and (2.4) for the FDI choice esti-
mation. The upper half of the table presents the TFP effects obtained from the high-capital-
intensity subsample, and the lower half presents the results for the low-capital-intensity
subsample.
From the results pertaining to estimation Equation (2.2), provided in the first and second
row on each side (upper and lower half), we can see the positive and statistically significant
TFP effect across all kinds of sample partitionings (above mean, median, and 75th percentile
of capital intensity) in the high-capital-intensity industry. Also, this positive productivity
effect is not sensitive to the inclusion of firm size and year fixed effects. The year fixed effect
here can capture macro shocks, including exchange rate changes during sample periods. In
the low-capital-intensity subsample, positive TFP effects are still prevalent; however, the
TFP effects become statistically indistinguishable from zero in industries with the lower
capital intensities. This is consistent with results from Nunn and Trefler (2012). In terms of
the magnitude of the TFP effects, estimated coefficients in low-capital-intensity sectors are
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approximately two-thirds of those in high-capital-intensity sectors.14
As mentioned in the previous section, a two-step estimation (Equations (2.3) and (2.4))
was performed to check whether the baseline estimation results (shown in rows 1 and 2) were
confounded due to the potential endogeneity bias. From the first-stage regression (Equation
(2.3)), the estimated coefficient of the first lag of TFP is found to be 0.833 and the reported
Wald statistic is 111.38 with a corresponding p-value is 0.000. The AR (1) test rejects the
null hypothesis of first-order serial correlation, and the AR(2) test does not reject the second-
order serial correlation at the 5 % significance level. When year-fixed effects are included in
both stages, the estimated coefficient of the first lag of TFP is 0.307 with a p-value of 0.000.
The Wald statistic is 300.03. Also, the null hypothesis of first-order serial correlation is
still rejected and second-order serial correlation is not rejected even at very low significance
levels, indicating no misspecification in the first-stage estimation with or without year-fixed
effects.
The third row of the top and bottom panels of Table 2.4 provide second-stage estimation
(Equation (2.4)) results. After controlling for potential endogeneity bias, positive and sta-
tistically significant TFP effects are found only in capital-intensive industries. Based on the
magnitude of the estimates, the TFP effect becomes larger upon instrumenting in the case of
high-capital-intensity industries. The downward bias of the baseline estimate indicates that
it may have failed to capture a possible channel through productivity affects the choice in fa-
vor of FDI. That is, a productivity shock can favorably affect the foreign outsourcing decision
in the capital-intensive sector, which in turn can prevent the firm from being primarily an
FDI firm.15 Consistent with the claim, the correlation between first-stage and second-stage
residuals in the two-step estimation turns out to be negative and statistically significant.
14One of the drawbacks of the panel logit estimation method is that calculating the marginal effect of
the independent variables is infeasible. Additionally, LPM FE estimation was conducted and very similar
patterns of TFP effect were found. Although the Linear Probability model could not incorporate the non-
linearilty, inferred marginal effect on FDI choice in above-median industry (i.e., without firm control and
year-fixed effect) indicates that a 10% increase of TFP would increase FDI main choice probability by 0.13%.
15The positive correlation between productivity and foreign outsourcing participation in capital-intensive
industries can be found from Table 2.10.
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In the low-capital-intensive subsample, the estimated coefficient of control function i.e.,
the first-stage residual is not statistically significant. That is, in the less-capital-intensive
sectors, enodogeneity bias might not exist.
2.5.2.4 Results : Foreign outsourcing and offshoring choice
The foreign outsourcing choice estimation can be found from Table 2.6. From the baseline
estimation (shown in the first and second row), no conclusions can be drawn as no estimated
TFP effects are statistically significant. The dramatically different patterns between foreign
outsourcing and previous FDI estimation results can be seen from the two-step estimation
results (shown in the third row). Now, we can see the positive and statistically significant
TFP effect in the less-capital-intensive subsample, which is the opposite of what was seen
in the case of FDI. Again, there might be another effect of productivity on the foreign
outsourcing choice through the effect of TFP on domestic outsourcing decisions.16 This
possible correlation between TFP and the error term is corrected using the control function
approach.
The effect of productivity on offshoring choice is shown in Table 2.7. Since the offshoring-
dependent variable is constructed by combining FDI and FO dependent variables, the pos-
itive and statistically significant TFP effects are found in the middle range of the capital
intensities, which is somewhere between the results for the FDI and FO choices.
Overall, Hypothesis 2 seems to be supported by empirical evidence. It is found that higher
productivity leads to higher likelihood of FDI choice in capital-intensive industries. Foreign
outsourcing likelihood is positively related to productivity in the less-capital-intensive indus-
tries when potential endogeneity is controlled for. Offshoring choice seems to resemble FDI
choice possibly due to the greater prevalence of FDI activity among Korean manufacturing
firms.
16The empirical finding that productivity affects domestic outsourcing participation is omitted to save the
space but can be provided on request.
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2.5.3 Hypothesis 3
This section provides a description of the process to analyze the Hypothesis 3 by a discrete
time duration model.
Jenkins (1995) provides a simple practical approach for the discrete-time duration anal-
ysis when the sample is selected at a certain state (stock sample) and interviewed over a
fixed interval. After first showing that the conditional survivor probability only requires
data between the sample selection and the interview periods, the paper shows that sequence
likelihood can be expressed as a usual binary dependent variable regression likelihood, such
as logit or probit. That is, we can apply the standard binary dependent regression technique
to the duration type analysis after data reorganization.
For Hypothesis 3, the selected base sample consists of firms that continuously participate
in domestic outsourcing from 2006 to 2010 and do not participate in FDI activity in the
initial year (i.e., 2006). Then, the event is defined as their first time participating in FDI
activity. The time-varying regressor that affects the occurrence of this event is firm-level
total factor productivity. As part of the data reorganization, observations after the event
year (FDI participation year) are dropped since the unit of analysis is now the years of event
occurrence rather than the firms. Different from duration type studies that also focus on
survival time hazard rate estimation, this paper focuses primarily on the effect of the time-
varying regressor on the event given the relatively short time periods. Finally conventional
logit estimation is applied using the binary-dependent variable on FDI participation along
with the time-varying regressor, i.e., productivity. Also, year dummy variables are included.
Table 2.7 shows the results of discrete time duration analysis. From the estimation
with full sample (column 1), we can clearly see that the total factor productivity affects
domestic outsourcing firms’ FDI participation over time. The estimated average marginal
effect is 0.007. That is, a 10% increase in TFP corresponds to about a 0.1% increase in the
probability of starting FDI. In the estimation with partitioned sample (columns 2-7), the
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TFP effect does not differ across capital intensity when the sample is split by the mean of
capital intensity; however, when it is compared with the median subsamples, we can see that
the positive TFP effect exists only in capital-intensive industries. Also, the magnitude of
TFP impact becomes larger than full sample estimation. In the subsamples with extreme
value of capital intensity, the estimated sign is reversed but is not statistically distinguishable
from zero.
Generally, in the dynamic context, TFP improvement plays a role in domestic outsourcing
firms decision about foreign sourcing involvement. This is in line with Hypothesis 3; however,
these estimated TFP effects are not robust to the inclusion of firm controls. This may be
due to the simple discrete type of approach adopted here which is unable to incorporate
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Although this evidence of dynamic behavior can supplement
the empirical exploration of the firm organization, a continuous time duration model with
data on longer time periods that can also handle with firm heterogeniety would strengthen
the results in this section.
2.6 Participation Behavior
As a robustness check, estimation Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are estimated with participation-
dependent variables. Although participation of a particular type of sourcing does not neces-
sarily mean that it is firms optimal sourcing choice, we can expect the same determinants,
capital intensity and productivity, and impact on the pattern of participation behavior. This
conjecture is empirically confirmed and presented in this section.
Table 2.8 shows the estimation results of Equation (2.1) for Hypothesis 1. The effect of
capital intensity is still estimated to be positive and statistically significant on the partici-
pation of vertical integration, including FDI and DI. Comparing the estimated magnitude
with those in Table 2.2, a larger impact of capital intensity on the FDI participation is now
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estimated. This is a reasonable result as firms should first participate in FDI in order for
FDI to be their main choice. Different from the results in Table 2.2, a positive capital in-
tensity effect on outsourcing participation is estimated; however, no statistical inference can
be drawn from these estimates.
The impact of productivity on the FDI and foreign outsourcing participation decision
can be found from Tables 2.9 and 2.10. Still, the FDI participation decision is affected
by the total factor productivity only in the higher-capital-intensive subsamples. Also, the
magnitude of the effect of TFP on FDI participation is higher than on FDI as the main choice,
which can also be reconciled with the relative ease of FDI participation (compared to being a
primarily FDI firm). A significant difference between main choice behavior and participation
behavior is found from the foreign outsourcing regression. Although the results for the case of
lower-capital-intensive industries are similar, TFP does actually increase foreign outsourcing
participation probability in the capital-intensive sector. Accordingly, we can infer from the
results that firms would join both foreign outsourcing and FDI as productivity grows but the
effect on FDI participation is stronger in capital-intensive industry. To summarize, except
for the case of foreign outsourcing, Hypotheses 1 and 2 still hold even with participation-
dependent variables.
2.7 Summary and Conclusion
Analyzing different patterns of global sourcing behavior is useful to understand today’s
globally linked economy. Property rights models of global sourcing in particular pay attention
to the role of contract incompleteness. Due to the roles of contract incompleteness and
the fixed cost of global sourcing, models by Antra`s (2003) and Antra` and Helpman (2004)
theoretically find that capital intensity and productivity are the two key elements that drive
the different offshoring choices.
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Using Korean firm-level panel data, I have empirically investigated the determinants of
firms’ organizational choices. The main predictions of the two benchmark property rights
models, Antra`s (2003) and Antra`s and Helpman (2004), are validated by my study. Con-
sistent with the findings in the literature, the positive association between capital intensity
and the internalization decision is found across different specifications. After controlling
for the potential endogeneity in the sourcing choice through a two-stage control function
method, the results lead to the conclusion that higher productivity with greater (lower)
capital intensity induces a choice of foreign integration (outsourcing). These main results
are supplemented by the examination of dynamic behavior of domestic outsourcing firms
that show potential FDI participation with improving productivity over time. Some of the
sourcing participation behaviors turn out to be different from the main sourcing behaviors.
This would be an interesting topic for further investigation.
Effects are identified through fixed effects estimation which only uses changes in firms’
sourcing status over the years; however, the main estimation results are not specific to the
fixed effects logit estimation. Quite similar results are obtained from a linear probabil-
ity model (LPM) with firm-fixed effects. Random effects estimation is not appropriate in
this study because it is reasonable to assume that firm-level productivity is correlated with
unobservable firm heterogeneity. The Hausman test based on the LPM also supports the
fixed-effects assumption.
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CHAPTER III
Offshoring, Exports and Employment : Theory and
Evidence from Korean Firms
3.1 Introduction
In large parts of the developed world, manufacturing employment has been declining.
This decline has coincided with increasing globalization, mainly taking the form of greater
openness to international trade. In order to understand the role of international trade in
the decline of manufacturing employment we first need to understand whether it is coming
about through the exit of firms from the manufacturing sector or a decline in employment
at the firm level. As pointed out by Groizard, Ranjan and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014), in
the US computer and peripheral equipment industry, the period 2001-2010 was one which
experienced a sharp 44 percent decline in employment and a 28 percent decline in the number
establishments, indicating that employment in the industry declined both through firm exit
as well as reductions in employment at the firm level. At the same time the industry
witnessed a significant rise in input and final good trade.
Turning to a late industrializer, namely Korea, we find something similar. Between 1991
and 2012, manufacturing employment has declined from 5.2 million to 4.2 million, while
its manufacturing share of employment has fallen from 28 percent to 17 percent (Source:
OECD). In this paper, we study whether there is a decline in firm-level employment in
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response to greater trade openness. In particular, we want to look at how firm-level em-
ployment is related to input and output trade. However, it needs to be realized right at the
outset that there could be considerable heterogeneity in how firms react to greater possibili-
ties for input and output trade. For example, these possibilities can provide some firms with
the opportunity to import inputs, which could either be substitutes for or complements to
inputs produced by workers in-house, depending on which firm employment could go up or
down in response to greater input imports. Also, greater export and import possibilites will
benefit the relatively productive firms that will be able to compete with foreign firms in the
world market, while they could hurt the less productive firms who will not be able to survive
foreign competiton or might in response shrink their output and employment.
To study various possible employment outcomes related to trade, we extend the small
country trade model with firm heterogeneity, developed by Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare
(2013) as an extension of the well-known Melitz (2013) model. In the Demidova-Rodriguez-
Clare model we incorporate offshoring (along with final goods trade). Our theory predicts
that a decrease in the trading cost of final goods will lead to losses for non-exporting firms
in employment due to the “selection effect,” equivalent to greater effective competititon in
the domestic market. Our model predicts that in addtion to such an effect, exporting firms
also experience an opposing effect: an increase in their labor demand due to an increase in
exports as exporting costs are lower. However, when there is a decrease in the offshoring
cost or the cost of importing inputs, we should expect non-offshoring firms (whether export-
ing or not) to suffer losses in employment due to the “selection effect” or greater effective
competition primarily driven by the lower prices charged by each offshoring firm (due to
the cost reduction brought about by offshoring). Offshoring firms experience another effect
on their labor demand, which is an increase in it due to the productivity effect (or cost
reduction) when inputs produced by in-house labor and imported inputs are complements.
Among the offshoring firms, those that export as well will also experience a positive export-
ing effect: a lower cost of production or higher productivity will help expand exports and in
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turn employment.
Our theoretical model acts as a useful guide for empirically investigating the firm-level
employment effects of offshoring and final goods trade, especially when it comes to the
effects that are heterogeneous across firms. However, there are important aspects of the
real world that our theoretical model does not capture, but which might show up in the
results of our empirical investigation. Firstly, we do not allow for a competitive effect of
offshoring on the market for the import-competing intermediate input (domestic substitute
of the foreign input). When the offshoring cost (trading cost of the offshored input) goes
down, a larger fraction of firms would offshore, which could depress the price of the import-
competing intermediate input through a fall in its demand. Thus, it is quite possible that
then there would be a positive productivity effect not only in the case of offshoring firms
but also other firms. Secondly, we also take the intrinsic productivity of each firm as a
given throughout after a firm’s draw from a given distribution. The only change we see is in
effective productivity (a decline in unit cost) that results from greater offshoring due to a fall
in the trading cost of the offshored input. There is no other productivity effect of trade in our
model, in the form of learning, R&D etc. There is, however, overwhelming evidence showing
a positive productivity effect of import competition which makes firms more efficient.
We perform our empirical investigation using firm-level data from Korea. The firm-level
Korean panel data are drawn from Survey of Business Activity (SBA) for the years 2006-2011.
Our empirical work also requires trade costs for final goods as well as separately for inter-
mediate goods or inputs. We use tariffs from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS),
which need aggregation and concording to the Korean 3-digit classification. Transport costs
are constructed at the 3-digit level by adjusting the US transport costs (for disaggregate
categories) for different distances between Korea and its various major trading partners,
which is followed by import-weighted aggregation, and then a process of concordance. The
trade costs are the sum of import tariffs and transport costs. From the final goods trade
costs, we create input trade costs using the input-output table for Korea, along with some
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additional concordance. In addition, we need measures of output and input elasticities of
substitution, which are derived from the elasticities of substitution in Broda and Weinstein
(2006) and from Rauch (1999), again requiring further aggregation and concording as well
as transformation using the input-output matrix.
Our empirical analysis yields several results, most of them consistent with our theory
and/or our economic intuition. We find that input and output trade cost reductions increase
both the volume of firm-level exports and imports as well as the number of firms exporting
and the number importing. Also, there is a strong positive association between firm-level
exports and firm-level imports of inputs. We next look at the direct impact of trade costs
on firm-level employment. As expected from theory, the impact of the input trade cost
on firm employment changes from positive to negative as we move from the subsample
of firms in industries where inputs are on average substitutable to the subsample of firms
in complementary input industries. We also find that, on the whole, greater imports are
associated with greater employment, indicating that on average the imported inputs are
complementary to firm-level employment. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the
magnitude of the postive employment effect of input imports is greater for exporting firms
and in firms in industries where inputs are relatively more complementary. These results are
fairly robust to specification, including instrumental variables estimation, which we perform
to address the simultaneity of employment and imports.
While we use an instrumental variables approach to address our problem of simultaneity,
we also use an alternative approach of difference-in-difference with propensity score matching
similar to the one used by Girma, Geenaway, and Kneller (2003). Import status and em-
ployment might be simultaneously determined as both are ultimately functions of the firm’s
intrinsic productivity, i.e., larger firms (firms with higher output and employment levels) are
the ones that are likely to offshore (import inputs). Across all our difference-in-difference
specifications (with propensity score matching) importing (of inputs) leads to higher domes-
tic firm-level employment as well as firm-level exports. There is also some evidence that
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imports have a bigger positive impact on employment for exporting firms and this impact
keeps going up with the level of exports. Moreover, as found with our other regressions, here
as well the employment increasing impact of importing inputs from abroad is greater when
input complementarity is higher.
In many ways, the paper closest to ours is the one by Groizard, Ranjan and Rodriguez-
Lopez (2013). Using estbalishment level data from Californian manufacturing industries
from 1992 to 2004, they find that, consistent with the prediction of trade models with
heterogeneous firms, a decline in trade costs (input as well as output) is associated with
job destruction (creation) in the least (most) productive establishments, with firm death
most likely in the case of the least productive establishments. Interestingly, the effects of
input trade costs on job creation or destruction at the establishment level are greater in
magnitude than those of output trade costs. Note that this paper, unlike ours, does not look
at the interaction between importing and exporting or the role of input substitutability or
complementarity in the determination of firm-level employment.
The earliest related work which looks at the heterogeneous impact of trade on firm or
plant-level employment is Levinsohn (1999), who finds that in Chile, during their period
of trade reforms (1979-86), there were substantial inter-plant differences in the rates of job
creation and destruction based on plant size, with the smallest plants three times more likely
to destroy jobs through firm death but experiencing smaller magnitudes of job contraction
or destruction through contraction or expansion compared to the largest plants. The latter
results are along the lines of the findings of Biscourp and Kramarz (2007), who use French
firm-level manufacturing data from 1986 and 1992.
There are empirical studies that, similar to ours, try to separate the effects of input
and final-good trade costs but on other firm-level outcomes. The main outcome variables
to have been studied in that literature are plant-level productivity (Amiti and Konings,
2007 and Topolova and Khandelwal, 2011) and the range of goods produced at the firm-
level (Goldberg, Khandelwal and Pavcnik, 2010). There is considerable evidence from these
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studies that reductions in trade costs, especially in input trade costs, can result in increases
in firm/plant productivity and the product variety at the level of the firm. While these
outcome variables are quite different, one could easily see how the impact of trade and trade
costs on these outcome variables could constitute additional channels through which trade
and trade costs affect employment.
3.2 The Model
We extend the small country trade model of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) to
incorporate offshoring (along with final goods trade). Here the country of interest is called
Home which trades with rest of the world.
3.2.1 Preferences and Demand
The total size of the workforce in Home is L, which is also the number of individuals
in the economy. Individuals’ preferences are defined over a number of differentiated, non-
numeraire goods and a homogeneous, numeraire good. In particular, the utility function for
the representative consumer is given by
U = H +
N∑
i=1
η
η − 1Z
η−1
η
i , (3.1)
where H denotes the consumption of the homogeneous good, Zi =
(∫
ω∈Ωi z
c
i (ω)
σi−1
σi dω
) σi
σi−1
is the CES consumption aggregator of a continuum of differentiated varieties within the
ith differentiated good or sector, and η is the elasticity of demand for Zi (η governs the
substitutability between homogenous and differentiated goods). In Zi, z
c
i (ω) denotes the
consumption of variety ω, Ωi is the set of differentiated varieties available for purchase, and
σi > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. We assume that σi > η so that
differentiated-good varieties (within a differentiated good or sector) are better substitutes
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for each other than for the homogeneous good.
For differentiated goods, the representative individual’s demand for variety ω of the ith
differentiated good is given by zci (ω) =
pi(ω)
−σ
P 1−σi
PiZi, where pi(ω) is the price of variety ω,
Pi =
[∫
ω∈Ωi pi(ω)
1−σidω
] 1
1−σi is the price of the CES aggregator Zi, and hence, PiZi is
the household expenditure on differentiated varieties of good i. Given the quasi-linear and
additively separable utility in (3.1), it follows that Zi = P
−η
i , and therefore, the aggregate
demand for variety ω of the ith differentiated good is given by
zdi (ω) = pi(ω)
−σiP σi−ηi L. (3.2)
The homogeneous good, H, is produced by perfectly competitive firms using domestic
labor only. One unit of domestic labor produces one unit of the homogeneous good. This
fixes the domestic wage at 1 as long as some homogenous good is produced, which we assume
to be the case. Therefore, the income of each household simply equals 1. We assume that
the parameters are such that PiZi ≡ P 1−ηi < 1 for all i, so that a typical individual has
enough income to buy all differentiated goods.
The firms in Home face the following export demand for their products:
zxi (ω) = Ap
x
i (ω)
−σ.
where pxi is the price faced by consumers in the export market. However, there is a fixed
cost of exporting, fxi , and an iceberg trading cost, which has a general component τ
x
i and a
firm-specific component which will be discussed later. As a result, not all firms will export.
Note that the above demand function captures the idea that the income and price index in
the rest of the world are taken as given by Home firms.
As in Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) we assume there is a fixed number of firms
producing varieties of the ith good in the rest of the world denoted by N fi . Note that this
is the implication of the small country assumption, which means the small country, Home
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is not able to affect the number of firms in the rest of the world and takes that number
as given. However, only a subset of firms in the rest of the world will find it worthwhile
to export to Home. These exporting firms from the rest of the world also face a fixed cost
of exporting, f fi , and an iceberg trading cost, τ
f
i . As a result, only a subset of these firms
are able to export to Home. In the rest of the paper, we are going to make the following
symmetry assumption: τxi = τ
f
i = τi .
3.2.2 Production Structure
From now on, in order to avoid clutter we drop the subscript i from our notation. In
other words, we are focusing on firms in a given differentiated goods sector (out of several of
them). Suppose that after incurring an entry cost of fE a firm draws a triplet ψ = (ϕ, tx, to)
where ϕv is the exogenous productivity of the firm, tx ∈ [1, tx] is the firm-specific variable
cost of exporting, and to ∈ [1, to] is the firm specific variable cost of offshoring. ψ is drawn
from a distribution G(ψ) with the p.d.f. g(ψ). The production function of a Home firm with
triplet ψ and whose productivity is ϕ is z(ψ) = ϕY (ψ), with
Y (ψ) =
[
αL(ψ)
ρ−1
ρ + (1− α)M(ψ) ρ−1ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
, (3.3)
where L(ψ) is a composite of inputs produced within the firm, M(ψ) is a composite of inputs
procured from outside the firm, and ρ ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the two
types of inputs.1 We assume that one unit of labor is required to produce one unit of L(ψ).
The composite input M(ψ) can be either procured domestically or it can be offshored.
Let ps(ψ) denote the price paid by a firm with offshoring status s for a unit of composite
input M(ψ), for s ∈ {n, o}, where n denotes “not offshoring” and o denotes “offshoring”. If
M(ψ) is procured domestically, then pn(ψ) = pn for all ψ, that is, we are implicitly assuming
that pn units of the numeraire good translate into one unit of input M(ψ). If the production
of M(ψ) is offshored, a firm has to pay a fixed cost of offshoring, fo, and a variable cost,
1ρ, like some of the other parameters, can vary across the various differentiated goods sectors.
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po(ψ), per unit of input M(ψ). Let p
∗
M denote the price of input M in the foreign foreign
country, and let λ > 1 denote the iceberg cost of offshoring common to all firms and recall
that to is the firm specific variable cost of offshoring. It follows that
po(ψ) = λtop
∗
M , (3.4)
so that a decline in λ makes offshoring more attractive. Note that domestic firms have
incentives to offshore only if po(ψ) < pn(ψ) = pn.
Given our production function and (3.3), the marginal cost of a firm with triplet ψ and
offshoring status s is given by cs(ψ)
ϕ
, where
cs(ψ) ≡
[
αρ + (1− α)ρps(ψ)1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ (3.5)
is the price of a unit of Y (ψ) for a firm with status s ∈ {n, o}. Whenever a firm offshores it
must be the case that po(ψ) < pn, therefore, co(ψ) < cn(ψ) = cn as well.
There is a fixed cost of operation, f , for every producing firm. In addition to offshoring,
firms can export as well. There is a fixed cost of exporting fx, an iceberg shipping cost of
final goods common to all firms, τ > 1, and a firm specific shipping cost tx mentioned earlier.
3.2.3 Equilibrium
With CES preferences, the price set by a Home firm with productivity ϕv in the home
market is
p(ψ) =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
cs(ψ)
ϕ
, for s ∈ {n, o} (3.6)
The price that a firm charges in the foreign market, if it exports, is given as follows.
px(ψ) =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
τtxcs(ψ)
ϕ
, for s ∈ {n, o} (3.7)
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Given the above description of the model, there are 4 possible types of firms: Those
which sell only domestically and do not offshore, those which export but do not offshore,
those which offshore but do not export and those which do both offshoring and exporting.
A firm with triple (ϕ, tx, to) chooses the mode that maximizes its net profit. The net
profit is given by
pi(ψ; τ, λ) =
((
σ
σ − 1
)
cs(ψ)
ϕ
)1−σ
(
P σ−ηL+ (τtx)1−σ AIx
σ
)− f − foIo − fxIx (3.8)
where Io is the indicator variable for an offshoring firm and Ix is the indicator variable for
an exporting firm.
What condition do we need for the marginal surviving firm to not offshore or export?
Suppose the productivity of this firm is ϕ̂. If this firm doesn’t export or offshore then
((
σ
σ − 1
)
cn
ϕ̂
)1−σ
P σ−ηL
σ
− f = 0 (3.9)
The above gives the value of ϕ̂ for given P. It is shown in the appendix that the sufficient
conditions for the marginal surviving firm to neither export nor offshore are
((
cn
co(ψ)|to=1
)σ−1
− 1
)
f < fo;
((
σ
σ − 1
)
co(ψ)|to=1
ϕ̂
)1−σ (
τ 1−σA
σ
)
< fx.
The former requires the offshoring fixed cost to be high relative to the fixed cost of
operation f.
Now, substituting out P σ−η in (3.8), the net profits can be written as
pi(ψ, ϕ̂; τ, λ) =
(
ϕcn
ϕ̂cs(ψ)
)σ−1
f +
((
σ
σ − 1
)
cs(ψ)
ϕ
)1−σ
(
(τtx)
1−σ A
σ
)Ix − f − foIo − fxIx
(3.10)
That is, profits are a function of ϕ̂ and triple ψ.
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The model is solved using the free entry condition
Π ≡
∞∫
ϕ̂
∫
to
∫
tx
pi(ψ, ϕ̂; τ, λ)g(ψ)dtxdtodϕ = fe (3.11)
In the above to denotes to ∈ [1, to] and tx denotes tx ∈ [1, tx]. The proof of existence is given
in the appendix. Essentially, the above equation yields a value of ϕ̂. Once we have ϕ̂, we
can determine the mode of globalization of each firm given its ψ. A firm chooses the mode
that maximizes its net profits from the alternatives listed in (3.10). In general, among active
firms, those with low tx will export, while those with low to will offshore. In general, higher
productivity firms will engage in offshoring and exporting due to the fixed costs associated
with these activities.
Next, we derive the following lemma which is useful in comparative statics below.
Lemma: dϕ̂
dτ
< 0; dϕ̂
dλ
< 0.
That is, decreases in the costs of trading final goods or offshoring both increase the
survival productivity cutoff. The result with respect to τ is the standard selection effect in
a Melitz model and the result with respect to λ is its analogue for offshoring. Intuitively, a
decrease in the cost of offshoring increases the productivity of offshoring firms which increases
their sales domestically as well as abroad (for those who export) resulting in a selection effect
similar to that for the case of a decrease in the trading cost of final goods. This effect reduces
the sectoral price index P (primarily driven by the reduction in the costs and prices and the
increases in the sales of the offshoring firms), which in turn has a profit reducing effect. As
a result the break-even firm (which is purely domestic both in sales and input use) will be
one with a higher productivity.
Since our main aim is in deriving the implications of costs of offshoring and trading final
goods on employment, we present the expressions for employment derived in the appendix.
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Ls(ψ) = α
ρ (σ − 1) (cs(ψ)ρ−σ)(ϕcn
ϕ̂
)σ−1
f+Ixα
ρ
(
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
cs(ψ)
ρ−σ (τtx)
1−σ ϕσ−1A, for s ∈ {n, o},
where Ix is an identity function which takes the value 1 if the firm exports, and zero otherwise.
3.2.4 Comparative Statics with respect to τ
dLds(ψ)
dτ
= −αρ (σ − 1)2 (cs(ψ)ρ−σ) (ϕcn)σ−1 ϕ̂−σf dϕ̂
dτ
> 0
That is, there are job losses due to decreased domestic sales arising from the fall in the
trading costs of final goods.
dLxs(ψ)
dτ
= αρ (1− σ)
(
σ
σ − 1
)
c
s
(ψ)ρ−σt1−σx τ
−σϕσ−1A < 0
There are job gains due to increased exporting. Combining the above results we get the
following prediction for different types of firms.
d logL(ψ)
dτ
= −L
d(ψ)
L(ψ)
(σ − 1)
ϕˆ
dϕˆ
dτ
+
Lx(ψ)
L(ψ)
(1− σ)
τ
(3.12)
Therefore, for non-exporting firms there will be job losses (since in their case L(ψ) = Ld(ψ)
and Lx(ψ) = 0), but for exporting firms the impact would be ambiguous.
3.2.5 Comparative Statics with respect to λ
For non-exporting firms, we have the following effects on labor demand.
dLds(ψ)
dλ
= −αρ (σ − 1)2 (cs(ψ)ρ−σ) (ϕcn)σ−1 ϕˆ−σf dϕˆ
dλ
−(σ − ρ)αρ (σ − 1)
(
ϕcn
ϕ̂
)σ−1
fcs(ψ)
ρ−σ−1dcs
dλ
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When s = n, then dL
d
s(ψ)
dλ
> 0 because dcn
dλ
= 0. So, there are losses due to reduced
domestic sales for non-offshoring firms. What our model does not capture is that a fall in
the trading cost of the offshorable input, by reducing the demand for this input produced in
the domestic market, could depress pn and therefore also cn. By assumption, in our model
there is transformation of the numeraire good into the intermediate input at a constant rate.
However, in reality the domestic supply of this input could be upward sloping because of
capacity constraints arising from a limited amount of some required specific factor in the
background. In addition, there could be some degree of monopoly in the production of this
input. When s = o, it is very clear that dco(ψ)
dλ
> 0, and in the realistic case of σ > ρ, there
is job creation due to increased productivity of offshoring firms arising from the reduction
of offshoring costs. However, as mentioned above, in practice the downward pressure on
the domestic price of the offshorable input (not captured in our model) could also increase
productivity of purely domestic firms.
For exporting firms we have the following additional effects.
dLxs(ψ)
dλ
= − (σ − ρ)αρ
(
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
c
s
(ψ)ρ−σ−1 (τtx)
1−σ ϕσ−1A
dcs(ψ)
dλ
Now, when s = n, then dL
x
s (ψ)
dλ
= 0 because dcn
dλ
= 0, that is exporting firms that do not
offshore, do not experience any change in labor demand. However, as explained above,
dcn
dλ
= 0 only because in our model we assume constant rate of transformation of the numeraire
good into the intermediate input. When s = o, then clearly in the case of σ > ρ, we obtain
dLxs (ψ)
dλ
< 0 because dco(ψ)
dλ
> 0. This is the exporting effect of offshoring. That is, a decrease
in the cost offshoring induces exporting firms to increase their exporting activities, which
creates increased demand for labor.
Combining the above, we have the following results for the 4 types of firms in our model.
d logL(ψv)
dλ
= −L
d(ψv)
L(ψv)
(
(σ − 1)
ϕˆ
dϕˆ
dλ
+
(σ − ρ)
co(ψ)
dco(ψ)
dλ
Io
)
− L
x(ψv)
L(ψv)
(σ − ρ)
co(ψ)
dco(ψ)
dλ
Io (3.13)
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The above is going to give us the estimating equation in the empirical exercise.
3.2.6 Empirical Implications
There are a number of empirical implications of our theoretical model.
1. When there is a decrease in τ (the trading cost of final goods):
i. non-exporting firms suffer losses in employment due to the selection effect (increase
in ϕ̂)
ii. exporting firms experience two opposing effects: decrease in their labor demand
due to decrease in domestic sales, and increase in their labor demand due to increase in
exports
2. When there is a decrease in λ (offshoring cost, which is the trading cost of the
offshorable input)
i. non-offshoring firms (whether exporting or not) suffer losses in employment due
to the selection effect (increase in ϕ̂)
ii. offshoring firms that are non-exporting experience two opposing effects on labor
demand: decrease in labor demand due to the selection effect, but increase in labor demand
(when σ > ρ) due to the productivity effect.
iii. offshoring firms, that also export, experience changes in labor demand to meet
both domestic and export sales. They experience the same two opposing effects as non-
exporting firms as far as their labor demand for domestic sales is concerned. However,
they also experience a positive exporting effect (when σ > ρ). That is, their labor demand
increases to meet the export requirements. This last case is produced by an interaction
between exporting and offshoring.
Recall that our model is one with a multi-industry setting where different industries have
different σ and ρ and that we just suppressed the industry subscripts to minimize clutter in
our notation. We, therefore, have some further implications of our theoretical analysis for
empirical work.
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3. In industries where σ − ρ is large, firms experience a strong productivity effect of
offshoring which increases their demand for labor. In industries where σ − ρ is small firms
experience a weaker productivity effect, and hence the demand for labor is less likely to
increase. If σ < ρ, then the firm demand for labor unambiguously decreases in response to
offshoring.
It is important to note that there might be important aspects of the real world that our
theoretical model does not capture. Firstly, as already mentioned above, when the offshoring
cost goes down, we will have a larger fraction of firms offshoring, which can depress the price
of the import-competing intermediate input (offshorable input). This can arise as a result
of a limited amount of a specific factor in the background required to produce the input
domestically or monopoly power in the domestic market for this input. In addition, the
Ricardian nature of our numeraire sector fixes the wage in our model. In the absence of
such a sector, the price of the domestically produced input might go down even without the
features mentioned above. Thus, it is quite possible that a decline in the offshoring cost
(trading cost of the offshored input) leads to a positive productivity effect not only in the
case of offshorig firms but also other firms.
We also take the intrinsic productivity of each firm as a given after it has drawn its
productivity from a given distribution. The only change we see is in effective productivity
that results from greater offshoring due to a fall in the trading cost of the offshored input.
There is no other productivity effect of trade in our model, in the form of learning, R&D etc.
There is overwhelming evidence showing a positive productivity effect of import competition
which makes firms more efficient. This comes not only from the imports of inputs but also
from the imports of competing foreign products.
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3.3 Econometric Methodology
3.3.1 Basic Estimation
We start with the very basic estimating equations that verify how good our trade cost
measures are and whether manufacturing firms in Korea respond to changes in trade costs.
These estimating equations confirm whether the intensive and extensive margins of trade
(imports and exports) respond to changes in our input and output trade cost measures and
whether the direction of that response is consistent with our economic intutition. We start
with the following equation to study the impact of trade costs on the intensive margin of
imports.
ln(Importsijt) = α
M
i + α
M
j + α
M
t + β
M
1 τjt + β
M
2 λjt + ε
M
ijt (3.14)
where Importsijt is the value of imports of firm i in industry j in year t. As in the theory
section, τ and λ denote trading costs of output and input respectively. These costs vary
across industries over time. Note that the imports of firms are mainly intermediate inputs,
so Importsijt captures the extent of offshoring as defined in our theory section. Since we
are taking logarithms here, the zero import firms (non-offshoring firms) autormatically get
dropped from this regression.
To look at the extensive margin of importing we define an importing dummy IMPijt ∈
{0, 1} and run the following regression.
IMPijt = α
M ′
i + α
M ′
j + α
M ′
t + β
M ′
1 τjt + β
M ′
2 λjt + ε
M ′
ijt (3.15)
While this is a linear probability model, we also run a Probit version of this regression to
confirm that the results are unchanged.
Similarly defining Exportsijt as the level of firm exports and EXPijt ∈ {0, 1} as the
exporting dummy, we can run regressions to study the impact of trade costs on the intensive
and extensive margins of exports. These equations are analogous to our estimating equations
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above for imports.
3.3.2 Simple Estimation of the Association Between Offshoring, Exports and
Employment
To look at the average impact of changes in trade costs on employment at the level of the
firm (of all types: purely domestic and offshoring and/or exporting), we run the following
regression: se the following equation to estimate the impact of τ.
ln(Lijt) = α
L
i + α
L
j + α
L
t + β
L
1 τjt + β
L
2 λjt + ZijtΓ
L + εLijt (3.16)
where Lijt is firm-level employment observed on an annual basis and Zijt denotes the vector
of control variables. We run this regression for the overall sample as well as separately for
the subsample of firms in industries where inputs are expected to be substitutes of each other
and in the subsample of firms in industries where inputs are expected to be complements. We
also tried including interactions of these trade cost variables with exporting and importing
status dummy variables. While we will very briefly discuss those results, we do not present
them since they are inconclusive. This might have something to do with the fact that while
our dependent variable is at the firm level, the trade cost variables are at the industry level,
thereby providing inadequate variation for identification to take place. As a result, we run
the following regression.
ln(Lijt) = α
L′
i + α
L′
j + α
L′
t + β
L′
1 ln(importsijt) + β
L′
2 (ρjt − σjt) + βL
′
3 EXPijt
+βL
′
4 (ρjt − σjt) ln(importsijt) + βL
′
5 EXPijt ln(importsijt)
+ZijtΓ
L′ + εL
′
ijt (3.17)
Here ρjt and σjt are the elasticities of substitution between inputs and between output
varieties at the industry level. As mentioned above, since we are taking logarithms here,
the zero import firms (non-offshoring firms) automatically get dropped from this regression.
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We, therefore, try a variant of this specification where we replace ln(importsijt) with ln(1 +
importsijt). This small change in the regression keeps the zero-import observations in the
regression. We also run the regression dropping EXPijt ln(importsijt) and instead running
the regressions separately for exporting and non-exporting firms. These regressions are run
as plain OLS and with random firm effects and year fixed effects, with and without industry
effects. For the specification without EXPijt ln(importsijt), we also run instrumental variable
regressions where ln(importsijt) and (ρjt−σjt) ln(importsijt) are instrumented by λijt, (ρjt−
σjt) and (ρjt − σjt)λijt.2
3.3.3 Propensity Score Matching and Difference-In-Difference Estimation
As mentioned above, we have run instrumental variable regressions treating ln(importsijt)
and (ρjt−σjt) ln(importsijt) as endogenous. Import status and employment might be simul-
taneously determined as both are ultimately functions of the firm’s intrinsic productivity.
Thus larger firms (firms with higher output and employment levels) are the ones that are
likely to offshore (import inputs). To solve this simultaneity or endogeneity problem we run
a difference-in-difference regression with propensity score matching. Our method is similar
to the one used by Girma, Geenaway, and Kneller (2003).
First, we restrict the target sample to firms that are observed for the entire sample
period, 2006-2011. Then, we define an import starter as a firm that became an importer in
2007, 2008, 2009 or 2010. The treatment group here consists of these firms, since our focus in
this paper is on importing of inputs (or offshoring). We excluded complicated cases, namely
firms that discontinued importing after they first entered the import market. Our control
group consists of firms that did not import at all over our full six year sample period.
Matching firms in the treatment group with those in the control group was performed
2In this IV specification we drop the level term in (ρjt−σjt) from the right hand side of the second-stage
regression since it is completely insignificant by itself and its presence makes the identification of the impact
of other variables difficult, if not impossible. Also, there is no real theoretical basis for the inclusion of the
level term in (ρjt − σjt) on the right-hand side.
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on a cross-section by cross-section (year by year) basis. That is, for each year (2007, 2008,
2009 and 2010), the following probit model is estimated.
P (Import Starterit = 1) = F (lnTFPi,t−1, lnLi,t−1, (Sales/WageBill)i,t−1, EXPi,t−1)
(3.18)
For each year for which we run the probit for propensity score matching, our sample for
the probit regression consists of firms that start importing that year and those that do not
import at all that year. For each import starting firm that year, a firm from the control
group that is the closest in terms of the probability of starting importing that year is selected.
After matched firms are identified for each year, all observations on matched firms across all
years are pooled to create our final matched sample panel dataset.
To make sure our matching has been successful we perform a test of balancing hypothesis,
which consists of t-tests of equality of means of the matching variables between the control
and treatment groups. We also checked that for the matching variables the standardized
bias, mean difference between treatment and control group adjusted by the square root of
average sample variance, was small enough after matching. A rule of thumb is that it should
ideally be less than 5% (in absolute value) after matching (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
To find out the impact of importing on the firm’s total employment (or export volume), a
difference-in-difference regression was run on the matched panel dataset as per the following
estimating equation.
yit = φ+ δ1IMPi,t−1 + fi +Dt + ξit (3.19)
Here, dependent variable yit is either lnLit or ln(exportsi,t + 1). And IMPi,t−1 is a dummy
variable which for firm i takes the value 1 if it is importing in year t−1 (and is 0 otherwise).
Given the way our matched data set has been created, this variable takes the value 0 for
a treatment firm until it starts importing, and from then on the variable takes the value
1 indicating the post import starting periods for firms in the treatment group. Since the
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impact of importing of inputs on employment might show up with a small lag and because we
want to minimize the endogeneity problem, our left-hand side variable of interest is lagged by
a year and δ1 represent the one-year lagged average change in the outcome, yit, attributable
to the firm starting to import. We also try including contemporaneous variables. However,
since results do not change qualitatively we do not present them.
To test whether importing effect on employment is affected by the volume of exports or
the extent of input substitution, we include four other terms as follows:
yit = φ
′ + δ′1IMPi,t−1 + δ
′
2(ρjt − σjt) + δ′3(exportsi,t−1 + 1) + δ′4(ρjt − σjt)IMPi,t−1
+δ′5(exportsi,t−1 + 1)IMPi,t−1 + f
′
i +D
′
t + ξ
′
it (3.20)
3.4 Data Description
3.4.1 Firm-level Variables
The firm-level Korean panel data are drawn from Survey of Business Activity (SBA)
for the years 2006-2011. Conducted by Statistics Korea, this survey covers all business
entities with a capital stock greater than US$300,000 and employment greater than 50 regular
workers. Restricting ourselves to the manufacturing sector, our sample consists of 8,094 firms
and 33,098 observations. Our firm-level import, export, sales, capital stock and employment
data come from the SBA.
3.4.2 Trade Cost
The sectoral trade cost is an important determinant of offshoring, imports and exports.
To match with our firm-level data, the trade cost is constructed at the 3-digit level of the Ko-
rean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC, revision 9). The specifics of the construction
of the output and input trade costs are provided in the following subsections.
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3.4.2.1 Output Trade Cost
The standard definition of output trade cost in the literature is the sum of the tariff rate
and transport cost as a percentage of the value of imports. The import weighted sectoral
tariff is arrived at by constructing a import-weighted average of all the 6-digit HS MFN
import tariffs from the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution(WITS) within each
3-digit industry. We then use our own concordance between HS and KSIC to arrive at the
KSIC 3-digit trade costs.
The data on industry transport costs are based on product-level transport costs which
are available from “U.S. Imports of Merchandise”.3 Collected by the US census bureau, this
dataset contains direct transport cost information for each product from various countries
of origin to the US.4 The product level ad valorem transport cost can be defined as the ratio
of import charge to the customs import value, where import charge is the cost of all freight,
insurance and other charges in the process of export. The customs import value is the total
value of imports at the border excluding duties and import charges.
To use the U.S. transport cost data for the construction of Korean transport costs, we
perform the following steps. First, we construct Korea’s transport cost at the HS 6-digit
level with each of its major trading partners, namely China, Japan, Southeast Asia, EU27,
and North America (NAFTA). Since transport cost information between Korea and each of
these partners is not available, we use as proxies the distance-adjusted transformations of
the U.S. costs of shipping from the same countries. However, for these transformations to
result in valid proxies it is important to make sure that the US import structure is close to
Korea’s, which we actually find to be the case. For example, there is a 98 percent overlap
between the products imported by Korea and the US from China, while in the case of
imports from the EU this overlap is 94 percent. There is also very significant overlap in
3Obtained from Peter Schott’s webpage.
4Conventionally, matched partner c.i.f. to f.o.b. ratio from UN COMTRADE database is used as a
commodity level transport cost measure. However, as Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) pointed out, this
indirect transport cost measure is not usable at the commodity level due to severe measurement error. They
found only 10% of the ad valorem shipping costs (at the 2-digit level) to be in the 0-100% range.
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products imported from other parts of the world. Finally, industry-level import weighted
transport costs are computed after averaging product level costs weighted by imports. When
we compute weights to be applied to product-level transport costs of imports from the EU,
we use the total amount of imports from all EU27 member countries. Similarly, the sum of
NAFTA imports is used for weighting Korea-US transport cost.
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) calculated U.S. sectoral transport cost using the
same data source. The import weighted average for the entire manufacturing sector was 5.6%
during the period 1977-81, 4.4% during 1982-86, and 4.1% during 1987-1991. To compare, we
also compute the overal manufacturing sector transport cost for Korea. The simple average
for the period 2006-2010 turns out to be 2.6%, while the import-weighted average is 1.8%.
Considering that our data are more recent, they seem to capture the declining trend.
3.4.2.2 Input Trade Cost
Following Amiti and Konnings (2007), input trade cost is generated by taking the weighted
average of the output trade cost with the weights from the Korean input-output table for the
year 2005. The input trade cost computed using this method is highly correlated with the
output trade cost, 0.89 for 2008 and 0.87 overall. This makes it difficult to identify separately
the impact of the input and output trade costs when both trade costs are simultaneously
included in the same regression. For this reason, we also construct an alternative input trade
cost measure by exclude diagonal elements of the input-output table from our computations.
The correlation coefficient between the output trade cost and the alternative input trade
cost measure is much lower, 0.61 for 2008 and 0.57 overall.
3.4.2.3 Input Substitutability
Input substitutability significantly affects the overall effect of offshoring on firm level
domestic labor demand. In this study, we introduce two measures of input substitutability
index used in the estimation.
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3.4.2.4 Input Rauch Index
To measure industry input substitutability, we first construct an output substitutability
index using the well-known Rauch classification. Rauch (1999) classifies goods into three
categories as organized, reference priced, and differentiated. If a good is traded in an orga-
nized world exchange, it is considered homogeneous. After assigning a value of 0 to each
organized-exchange product, 0.5 to each reference-priced good, and 1 to each differentiated
good and using imports as weights, we generate a time varying import weighted output
Rauch measure at the 3-digit level.5 In this way, industries where there is a greater propor-
tion of imports of homogeneous (differentiated) goods will have lower (higher) value of the
output Rauch index.6 Finally, the input Rauch index is constructed using weights from the
input-output table the same way these weights were used for constructing the input trade
cost. This index can possibly capture the ease of substitution between inputs in production
within an industry. If an industry’s inputs are mostly homogenous then inputs for this in-
dustry are more substitutable. Also, inputs for a sector would be more complementary with
more differentiated inputs. That is, our input Rauch index is decreasing (increasing) in the
degree of substitutability (complementarity).
3.4.2.5 Input Elasticity of Substitution
The data on output elasticity of substitution are from Broda and Weinstein (2006) and are
the estimates of the elasticity of substitution betwen product varieties for the U.S. elasticity
of substitution during the period 1990-2001.7 This output elasticity of substitution estimate
for each product (SITC rev.3) is first converted to HS code (6 digit) and is then assigned to
KSIC industries using a concordance table we have created. Then using the level of imports
5Rauch Classification data is available from Jon Havman’s webpage. By combining already created HS07-
KSIC concordance table with HS07-SITC ver.2 concordance table from the World Bank database, we could
match each Rauch classification to 3 digit Korean industries
6According to Rauch (1999), chemical products are typical examples of reference priced good. Our output
Rauch index value of Chemical Sectors(201-203) are in the range between 0.5 and 0.7. On the other hands,
Flat-Panel Display can be considered as differentiated product as it is usually branded. The index of this
industry (Sector 262) turn out to be 1.
7The estimates are publicly available at David Weinstein’s website.
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as weights, 3-digit industry level output elasticity of substitution measure is created. Finally,
the input elasticity of substitution measure is obtained by using input-output in the same way
we created input rauch index. The correlation between the input elasticity of substitution
and the input Rauch index is -0.52.
Table 3.1 provides all the summary statistics of the main variables used in this paper.
3.5 Empirical Results
In Table 3.2 we present regression results which show whether the intensive and the
extensive margins of exports are affected by trade costs. All columns in this table show
results from the estimation of regressions with random firm effects along with year fixed
effects. While OTC denotes output trade cost, ITC denotes input trade cost. In columns (1)
and (2), we see a negative and significant impact of input and output trade costs respectively
on the intensive margin of exports. A one percentage point reduction in the input trade cost
(which is on average more than a 10 percent reduction) leads to a 3.8 percent increase in the
intensive margin of exports (in firm-level exports), while a one percentage point reduction
in the output trade cost (which is again on average more than a 10 percent reduction) leads
leads to a 2.7 percent increase in the intensive margin of exports
At the level of disaggregation at which we are performing our study and at which the
input-output table for Korea is constructed, the diagonal elements of the input-output table
are large in magnitude. In other words, the input of a 3-digit industry into itself is large,
which results in a very high correlation between the input and output tariffs, in turn making
it difficult to identify their effects separately when thrown into the right-hand side of a
regression simultaneously. Therefore, we construct a modified input trade cost variable based
on the off-diagonal elements of the input-output matrix applied to industry-level output trade
costs. This is the input trade cost measure, denoted by ITC2 used in all our regressions in
which both input and output trade costs are thrown in simultaneously. Column (3) shows
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the results of such a regression, where again we have random firm effects and year fixed
effects. Here a one percentage point decrease (on average a 10 percent decrease) in the input
trade cost leads to a 2 percent increase in the intensive export margin. The impact of the
output trade cost here is also the same in terms of both sign and magnitude.
From columns (4) through (6), where we look at the extensive margin using linear prob-
ability models again with random firm effects and year fixed effects, we see that the impact
of a percentage point decrease in the input trade cost is to increase the probability of ex-
porting by 0.004-0.007, while a percentage point decrease in the output trade cost leads to
an increase in the probability of importing by 0.003-0.004. Thus, we can conclude from the
results presented in Table 3 that input and output trade cost reductions increase both the
volume of exports of exporting firms as well as the number of firms exporting. A reduction
in input trade costs lowers a firm’s cost of production and makes it more competitive in the
export market (and raises its profitability of exporting). This can make existing exporting
firms export more. It also enables initially non-exporting firms to jump their fixed costs of
exporting and start exporting. Note that we have assumed symmetry in the final goods trade
costs across exports and imports. Note also that an important component of our measure
of trade cost is transport cost. Transport costs are really symmetric even empirically, so a
reduction in them either over time within the same industry or as we move from one industry
to another over time will mean that the costs of both importing competing products as well
as of exporting go down. Therefore, a reduction in the output trade costs will result in an
increase in the intensive and extensive margins of exports.
In Table 3.3 we present regression results on how the intensive and the extensive margin
of imports are affected by trade costs. Once again, all columns show results from regressions
with random firm effects along with year fixed effects. In columns (1) and (2), we see a
negative and significant impact of input and output trade costs respectively on the intensive
margin of imports. A one percentage point reduction in the input trade cost (more than
a 10 percent reduction) leads to a 1.4 percent increase in the intensive margin of imports
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(in firm-level imports of inputs), while a one percentage point reduction in the output trade
cost (again on average more than a 10 percent reduction) leads to a 0.8 percent increase in
the intensive margin of imports
Column (3) shows the results of a regression where our modified input trade cost and the
output trade cost variables are thrown in simultaenously into the right-hand side. Here a one
percentage point decrease (on average a 10 percent decrease) in the input trade cost leads
to a 1 percent increase in the intensive import margin. A one percentage point decrease in
the output trade cost leads to a 0.5 percent increase in the intensive import margin. From
columns (4) through (6), where we look at the extensive margin using linear probability
models again with random firm effects and year fixed effects, we see that the impact of a
percentage point decrease in the input trade cost is to increase the probability of importing by
0.003-0.004, while a percentage point decrease in the output trade cost leads to an increase
in the probability of importing by 0.001-0.002. Thus, we can conclude from the results
presented in Table 3.3 that input and output trade cost reductions increase both the volume
of imports of importing firms as well as the number of firms importing. While the impact
of a reduction in the input trade costs on imports is direct and obvious, a reduction in the
output trade costs, through an increase a firm’s exports, can lead to a greater demand for
inputs, including imported inputs. Similarly it also leads to more firms exporting, which
can, due to their bigger market and profits, jump their fixed costs of importing inputs.
Next we look at the association between exports and input imports. In the first two
columns, we restrict ourselves to the firm-year observations with positive exports. Here we
see that the elasticity of firm exports with respect to input imports lies in the range of 0.23-
0.28. Once we include the zero export observations by adding one to the level of exports
(columns (3) and (4)), so that the logarithm of (1 + exports) is defined, we see that the
elasticity increases to about 0.4. Note that columns (1) through (4) are regressions with
random firm effects and year fixed effects. When we switch from random effects to firm fixed
effects, the elasticities become quite a bit smaller but qualitatively the results are unchanged.
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We have seen that reductions in input and output trade costs lead to a higher likelihood
for each firm to export and to import inputs and that the amount that a firm imports and/or
exports goes up, with the two being positively associated with each other. We next look at
whether these export and import increases translate into increases in the size of domestic
employment at the firm level and how these effects, if they exist, vary by the exporting
and/or importing status of a firm. We also look at the direct impact of firm-level input
imports on firm-level employment.
In Table 3.5, we present the results of our basic regressions where we study the average
effect of input and output trade costs on employment. In Table 3.5, we split the sample into
the case where intermediate inputs are complements to domestic labor and the case where
they are substitutes. There are two ways we do these splits: on the basis of the median of
the degree of input substitutability minus the degree of substitutability between varieties
of the final product (here on called output substitutability) and, alternatively, based solely
on the median degree of input substitutability. Further we use two alternative measures
of substitutability, namely the Broda-Weinstein elasticity of substitution and the inverse
measure based on the Rauch index.8 All these regressions are random firm effects regressions
with year fixed effects.
For three out of the four cases (three out of the four measures on the basis of which we
split our sample), shown in the first four and the last two columns, we see that, as expected
from theory, the coefficient of the input trade cost switches sign from positive to negative
as we move from the substitutable input subsample to the complementary input subsample.
This is true when the sample split is on the basis of the input elasticity of substitution minus
the output elasticity of substitution, just the input elasticity of substitution and the input
Rauch measure. For a one percentage point decline in the input trade cost (which is more
than a 10 percent reduction), employment decreases by 0.3-0.5% in the substitutable input
case but increases by 1.4-2.5% in the complementary inputs case. The interpretation of these
8The two measures are highly correlated negatively. The correlation between the input elasticity of
substitution based on the Broda-Weinstein measure and the input version of the Rauch index is -0.52.
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results is that as the input trade costs fall, the intermediate inputs become cheaper. If they
are substitutes of in-house inputs produced using domestic labor (or directly of the firm’s
domestic labor), then this fall in the price of inputs results in these imported inputs taking
the place of some of this domestic labor. Thus employment falls in this case. If these foreign
inputs are complements to in-house labor, then this fall in their price will lead to an increase
in the firm-level demand for domestic labor. It is important to note that this could also mean
that a fall in the trade cost could put greater competitive pressure even on the market for
domestically produced intermediate inputs (produced outside the final goods firm), thereby
also making them cheaper. This would also lead to the same result for non-offshoring firms.
The sign also switches in the same way for the coefficient of the output trade cost variable.
However, we should not read much into the sign of the output trade cost coefficient as it
might just be a combination of all possible effects.9 When we drop the output trade cost
from the regression (results not presented) and replace this modified measure of the input
trade cost with the traditional input trade cost measure, that incorporates both diagonal
and off-diagonal elements of the input-output table, we get qualitatively very similar results
with respect to the input trade costs.
We also tried including interactions of these trade cost variables with exporting and im-
porting status dummy variables. We do not present those results since they are inconclusive.
This might have something to do with the fact that while our dependent variable is at the
firm level, the trade cost variables are at the industry level, thereby providing inadequate
variation for such demanding identification to take place. In Table 3.6, we therefore look at
the direct impact of imports. The top panel of Table 6 uses the sample that also includes
firms that do not import. In order to include such observations, we have to add 1 to the
9On the one hand, purely domestic firms face greater competition from foreign firms and also there is
the selection effect, where the marginal firm that continues to operate is a higher-productivity firm when
the output trade cost falls. This leads to higher average productivity and lower average marginal cost and
average price (across the surviving firms), which reduces firm-level labor demand. Exporting firms increase
their employment through a bigger foreign market but decrease their employment through the selection
effect in the domestic market. On top of all this, there could be the positive productivity impact of falling
trade costs, for which there is considerable support in the existing literature. Finally, as we have discussed
earlier, a large part of the inputs are produced within a sector as seen in the large diagonal elements of the
input-output matrix. Thus the the output trade costs might be capturing some of the input cost effects.
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volume of imports, so that the logarithm of the number can be taken. On the whole, the
results here show that greater imports are associated with greater employment. This in-
dicates that on average the imported inputs are complementary to firm-level employment.
We also see, consistent with our theoretical predictions, that the magnitude of this effect is
greater for exporting firms. Furthermore, also consistent with our theoretical predictions,
the employment increasing effect of greater input imports is greater the more complemen-
tary the inputs are, which is an implication of the negative and significant coefficient of the
interaction of the import term with the difference between the input and output elasticity of
substitution. These results are fairly robust to specification. In the lower panel of Table 3.6,
we drop the zero import firms. The results are qualitatively absolutely the same, but the
coefficient magnitudes, especially of the pure import term is larger in magnitude. Probably
since many of the zero import firms also have fairly high employment levels, their inclusion
has a dampening impact on the overall positive coefficient.
Clearly, imports are endogenous to the size of the firm, one aspect of which is employment
size. We use input trade cost, ITC and its interaction with the difference between the input
and output elasticity of substitution, (ρ− σ) as instruments. We present these instrumental
variables regression results in columns 4, 5 and 6 for the entire sample and for the subsamples
of exporting and non-exporting firms separately. The results in the upper and lower panels
of Table 3.7 are qualitatively similar to the results in Table 3.6. Once again we see that
input imports increase employment. In Table 3.7B the elasticity of employment with respect
to imports in the IV case of exporting firms is roughly 0.072 (as opposed to 0.057 for non-
exporting firms) when the gap between the input and output elasticities of substitution is
zero. For every unit increase in this gap (for more substitutable inputs, holding constant
the substitutability between final varieties), this elasticity goes down by up to 0.001. Thus
this employment increasing effect for imports is stronger in the case of more complementary
inputs. In Table 3.7A, in the IV case the elasticity of employment with respect to imports is
positive but insignificant when the substitution elasticity gap is zero. For every unit increase
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in this gap (for more substitutable inputs, holding constant the substitutability between final
varieties), this elasticity goes down by up to 0.001.
We next discuss the validity of our instrumental variables. It is important to note that
ITC is included as a regressor in column (3) of Table 3.7 to check the exclusion restriction,
i.e., valid instruments affect the dependent variable only indirectly through the endogenous
variable. Here ITC turns out to be insignificant and the coefficients of the other two variables
(our variables of interest) remain unchanged. Also, the Craig-Donald (C-D) F-statistic for
column (4) in panel A of Table 3.7 is 17.46 which exceeds the Stock-Yogo (2005) weak IV
test critical value. Thus, going by this test statistic we do not have a weak instrument
problem here. Note that this test is based on an assumption of i.i.d. errors. A more robust
weak instruments test statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. Its value here turns out to
be 19.26 which exceeds 10, its rule-of-thumb critical value (Staiger and Stock, 1997), above
which weak identification is ruled out. So using ITC as an instrument for actual level of
(imports+ 1) seems to satisfy IV validity requirements. Similar test results are obtained for
columns (5) and (6) in Table 3.7A. When the estimation is based on the level of imports
(not imports+ 1) in Table 3.7B, we cannot be equally confident that the estimates are free
from the weak IV problem. The Kleibergen-Paap F Statistic is 9.52 for column (4) and is
8.88 for column (6). While these numbers are not greater than 10 they are fairly close to 10,
so the problem, if any, is not that serious.
We next move to the results for the the difference-in-difference estimation with propensity
score matching. In Table 3.8 we see that, for the initial year, the standardized bias prior to
matching is very high - in the range of 25-80%. After matching this bias goes down to below
10 percent in all cases and below 5 percent in three out of four cases. While before matching
we could easily reject the null hypothesis that the mean of each variable in the treatment
group is the same as that in the control group, after matching we cannot reject this null for
any of the variables.
In Table 3.9A we see that across all specifications importing (of inputs) leads to higher
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domestic employment. The OLS regressions show that importing on average increases firm-
level employment 34-39 percent. This is based on both variation over time and across
firms. However, the random and fixed effects specifications, focusing on the within variation,
indicate to us that a firm that becomes an importer experiences a 2- 6 percent increase in
employment. In Table 3.9B the dependent variable is ln(exports+1) in place of lnL. Clearly
from these regression results, other things remianing equal, importing is associated with much
higher exports. This is quite remarkable since lagged export status was used as one of the
variables to carry out the propensity score matching.
In Table 3.10 we find that there is some evidence that imports have a bigger positive
impact on employment for exporting firms and this impact keeps going up with the level of
exports. Across all specifications the coefficient of the lagged value of IMP. ln(exports+ 1)
is positive and in the four specifications involving plain OLS or random effects (with and
without year effects) it is both positive and statistically very significant. The negative
coefficient of the lagged value of IMP.(ρ−σ) shows that the employment increasing impact
of importing inputs from abroad is greater when input complementarity is higher. This
is intuitive and is consistent with the theory we presented earlier. Note, however, that the
coefficient estimate of this term, while negative throughout, is not significant (is not precisely
estimated). It is also interesting to note that these regressions indicate the possibility that,
when ρ − σ ≥ 0 and exports = 0, importing can have a negative impact on employment.
This is totally consistent with the predictions of our model. Of course, with high enough
values of exports and negative enough values of ρ − σ, importing by firms begins to have
a positive impact on employment. Again this is a result that is totally consistent with the
predictions of our model. The results also clearly show that exports by themselves lead to
high employment. More specifically, this is seen in the positive and significant coefficients of
IMP. ln(exports+ 1) and ln(exports+ 1).
In Table 3.11, in place of the level of exports we use the export status dummy. Once
again an employment increasing impact of importing is associated with being an exporter
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and greater complementarity between inputs. IMP.(ρ−σ) now becomes strongly significant
in a couple of the cases (the OLS regressions with and without year effects).
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we extend the small country trade model with firm heterogeneity, developed
by Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2013), where we incorporate offshoring (along with final
goods trade). Our theoretical model acts as a useful guide for empirically investigating the
firm-level employment effects of offshoring and final goods trade, especially when it comes
to the effects that are heterogeneous across firms, even though there are important aspects
of the real world that our theoretical model does not capture.
We perform our empirical investigation using firm-level data from Korea for the years
2006-2011, and trade costs for final goods as well as separately for intermediate goods or
inputs, combining data from different sources and transforming, aggregating and concording
according to our needs, specific to the country we study. There was also similar effort
involved in creation of our measures of input and output substitution, using other measures
already in the literature.
Our empirical analysis yields several results, most of them consistent with our theory
and/or our economic intuition. We find that input and output trade cost reductions increase
both the volume of firm-level exports and imports as well as the number of firms exporting
and the number importing. Also, there is a strong positive association between firm-level
exports and firm-level imports of inputs.
As expected from theory, the impact of the input trade cost on firm employment changes
from positive to negative as we move from the subsample of firms in industries where inputs
are on average substitutable to the subsample of firms in complementary input industries.
We find that, on the whole, greater imports are associated with greater employment, in-
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dicating that on average the imported inputs are complementary to firm-level employment.
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the magnitude of the postive employment effect
of input imports is greater for exporting firms and in firms in industries where inputs are
relatively more complementary. These results are fairly robust to specification, including
instrumental variables estimation, which we perform to address the simultaneity of employ-
ment and imports.
While we use an instrumental variables approach to address our problem of simultaneity,
we also use an alternative approach of difference-in-difference with propensity score match-
ing. Across all our difference-in-difference specifications (with propensity score matching)
importing (of inputs) leads to higher domestic firm-level employment as well as firm-level ex-
ports. There is also some evidence that imports have a bigger positive impact on employment
for exporting firms and this impact keeps going up with the level of exports. Moreover, as
found with our other regressions, here as well the employment increasing impact of importing
inputs from abroad is greater when input complementarity is higher.
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CHAPTER IV
Decomposition of the Changes in Korean Wage
Inequality During the Period 1998-2007
4.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades wage inequality has increased substantially in most developed
countries, including the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. South Korea1
is one of the few countries to have experienced high economic growth and decreasing wage
inequality from the 1980s to the mid 1990s. A large amount of literature (see, e.g. Kang and
Yun (2008), Chung and Choi (2001), Kim and Topel (1995) has) investigated the reverse
trend of wage inequality in Korea and has concluded that, consistent with the Kuznets
curve,2 income inequality in Korea has risen rapidly since the early 1960s and declined from
the 1980s to the mid 1990s after reaching a critical level.
Most recently, Lee et al. (2013) have argued that income inequality rebounded sharply in
the late 1990s when the Korean economy faced the Asian financial crisis. Kim (2013) claims
that after the Asian financial crisis the pattern of Korean income inequality follows to US and
UK type inequality (worsening income equality since 1980s) although it had been considered
as following Japan-France pattern (remaining relatively stable since the 1980s). Also, recent
1By following the convention, from hereafter we denote Korea for South Korea.
2Kuznets(1955) predicted that in the process of economic development income inequality first rises,
reaches the peak and falls after a certain critical threshold development stage and income level.
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studies (e.g. Sung (2014)) show that this rising trend inequality plateaued after the global
financial crisis in 2008 possibly due to the recently expanded redistributive policies.
Figure 4.1 illustrates Korean wage gap trends since 1980 across different income groups.
Consistent with the literature, we can clearly see the wage inequality worsening after the
mid-1990s and stabilizing in 2008. Also, it seems that the driving factor of overall wage gap
was fast wage growth of high-wage workers. Kim (2013) also points out that this differential
wage gap pattern across income groups became magnified after the 1997 Asian financial crisis
possibly due to the expansion of an incentive wage scheme among large business enterprises.
This paper focuses specially on the wage inequality during the period from 1998 to 2007,
the most recent period when wage inequality magnified over the previous three decades.
Previous studies suggest many reasons for this pattern, including skill- biased technological
change (SBTC), the aging population, and changes in the demographic structure. Also many
studies, including Yoo (1998), Hyun and Lim (2005), Cho (2008) and Kim(2008), focus on
changes in worker characteristics, labor union, and financial crisis; however, their empirical
evidences rely upon mean-based estimations. Distribution-based wage decomposition is im-
portant in that, as shown in Figure 4.1, the pattern of income inequality has varied across
various income levels, and workers different level of skill (e.g., education) are likely to affect
the wage distribution at different quartiles. (See, for US, Buchinsky (1994); for Germany,
Fitzenberger and Kutz (1997); for Uruguay, Gonzalez and Miles (2001)).
Also it is very possible that changes in job stability - due to the implementation of labor
market reforms to overcome the Asian financial crisis - have favored the high-income group.
According to Hyun and Lim(2005), the low income group increased from 4.7% in 1996 to
6.6% in 2000. Park and Mah (2011) suggest that the massive FDI inflow and revision of the
labor law in 1998 exacerbated wage inequality by allowing employers to terminate workers
more easily than before. The sharp decline in job stability during the financial crisis was
never reversed to reach previous levels, and played an important role in increasing the Korean
wage inequality.
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With regard to the effect of labor union, it has been conjectured that labor union in
Korea became more representative of the highly skilled workers after the mid-1990s (Lee
(2004)) and the major reason for this changed behavior may very well have been the labor
reform arising from the financial crisis.
In sum, evidence indicates that various factors of the growing wage gap since the mid-
1990s may have impacted different income groups to different extents. As far as we know,
this is one of very few studies to deal with the recent Korean wage inequality issue with
the distribution-based wage decomposition methodology developed recently in the field of
labor economics. Sung (2014a) and Kim and Kim (2012) applied the popular Dinardo et
al. (1996) decomposition method to examine the contribution of skill and minimum wage
changes. However, their focus had to be limited to specific variables in that the Dinardo
et al. (1996) method becomes practically infeasible when there are too many continuous
variables.
To decompose the changes in Korean wage inequality, we, in this paper, apply more
robust decomposition methods in the literature proposed by, Machado and Mata (2005), to
the Korean Labor and Income Panel Survey data for the years 1998 and 2007. Our results
suggest that the observed increase in education level can explain about 10% of the increase
in the 90/50 wage gap but had no impact on the changes in the 50/10 wage gap. Declining
unionization contributed about 5% of the changes in the upper-tail of wage inequality. We
also find that a compositional shift in the Korean labor force caused a steep increase in wages
in the upper-tail of the distribution.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the outline of the Machado
and Mata (2005) decomposition method and compares this approach with recently devel-
oped decomposition methods. In Section 4.3, we discuss the data and results. Section 4.4
concludes.
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4.2 Machado and Mata Deomposition Method
Machado and Mata (2005) method can be used to decompose the changes in the distri-
bution function of the individual outcome across two countries, time periods or subgroups of
population in several factors contributing to those changes. Autor et al. (2005) argue that
Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition provides a precise link between the ‘full variance
accounting’ technique for analyzing inequality introduced by Juhn et al. (1993) and the
kernel re-weighting proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996). To decompose the changes in wage
distribution function, Machado and Mata (2005) estimate a counterfactual wage distribution
(F (w)), which is of the form,
F (w) =
∫
G(w|x)dH(x).
Here G(.) is the conditional Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of wage (w) given
the covariates (X) in period t = 0 and H is the unconditional CDF of X in period t = 1.
Machado and Mata (2005) estimate the inverse of G through a linear quantile regression
model and estimate the integral through a simulation method.
Alternative methodologies such as the unconditional quantile regression by Firpo et al.
(2009), distributional regression by Chernozhukov et al. (2013), partial distributional policy
effects by Rothe (2012) can also be used to construct the counterfactual distribution function.
However, the asymptotic properties of the counterfactual distribution function from all these
approaches are supposed to give similar results as long as the underlying assumptions of
those models are valid. In practice, one of the advantages of the Machado and Mata (2005)
method over others is that it is intuitively very elegant and easy to implement. Machado
and Mata (2005) decomposition method is based on the fundamental assumption that the
conditional quantile function (Qτ (y|x)) is linear in parameters. Recently, Ghosh (2014) use
Chamberlain’s two stage Box-Cox quantile regression model when this linearity assumption
does not hold in a very skewed wage distribution function.
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Let α denotes any distribution statistics such as quantile, skewness, gini coefficients etc.
The changes in the wage distribution functions between the period t = 0 to period t = 1 is
as follows:
Fα(wt=1)−Fα(wt=0) = [Fα(wt=1)− Fα(wt=1;xt=0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Composition Effect
+ [Fα(wt=1;xt=0)− Fα(wt=0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wage Structure Effect
+ Residual
The residual effect is defined as the unexplained part of the total changes in the wage
distribution function. Similarly, Machado and Mata (2005) method measures the impact of
individual covariates (x˜t) by considering the following equation,
Impact of x˜t ≡ Fα(wt=1)− Fα (wt=1; x˜t=0, x?t=1) ,
where xt = [x˜t x
?
t ] and x
?
t are all the other covariates except x˜t. The counterfactual distri-
bution function Fα (wt=1; x˜t=0, x
?
t=1) can be recovered from Fα(wt=1;xt=0) by assuming that
x?t follows independent distribution.
4.3 Decomposition Method Results
The data are drawn from Korean Labor and Income Panel Survey for the years 1998 and
2007. The sample sizes are 4,106 and 5,563 respectively. The wage measured is a monthly
earnings in ‘Korean Won’. The regressor consists of years of schooling, union status and
other basic controls. Annual income is expressed in 2000 Korean Won using the consumer
price index. As shown in the summary statistics, women labor force participation rate
has increased from 33 to 40%, a trend that can be observed elsewhere in the world. The
unionization rate has decreased from 9 to 6.5 percent which is much lower compared to the
developed nations.
The top left panel of Figure 4.2 shows how the wage density function changes from 1998
to 2007. As the economy recovers from the financial crisis of 1997, the density function starts
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to have a longer right tail, shorter left tail and a mass shifting out from the center. The
shift in concentration away from the middle in both the direction implies bi-polarization of
the Korean wage distribution function. Nahm (2008) finds that the decrease in middle class
has been accompanied by the increase in the lower and upper classes. Although the income
share of the medium skilled workers is stable over time but the steep increase in the high
skilled workers income share causes the bi-polarization of Korean wage distribution.
The top right panel of Figure 4.2 represents the difference between the wage density
functions for the years 2007 and 1998. As shown the difference is positive in the upper half
and negative in the lower half of the distribution. These results imply that employment
opportunities for the high skilled workers have increased and for the low skilled workers have
decreased during the period 1998 to 2007. Lee et al. (2013) show that during the period
2003 to 2008, a large fraction of new jobs created in the small firms which consist of less
than 5 employees and the average wage of these firms is 46.7% compared to the big firms
which have more than 300 employees and argue that this sectorial wage gap can explain the
recent changes in wage inequality.
Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition method decomposes the changes in the wage
distribution into three parts, namely composition effect (changes in workers’ characteristics),
wage structure effect (market return of those attributes) and residual effect. To construct
the unconditional wage distribution function we take 3,000 quantiles. The third row of each
horizontal block in Table 4.2 indicates the percentage of the total change explained by the
indicator factor and the numbers in the parenthesis represent the 95% confidence interval
which has been generated through 500 bootstrap replications.
Table 4.2 shows that both the composition and wage structure effects have positive con-
tribution to the changes in wage distribution function because their effects are significantly
different from zeros especially in the upper-tail of the distribution. The left bottom panel
of Figure 4.2 shows that wage structure effects are quantitatively more important in the
lower half of the distribution and composition effects explain a major fraction of the total
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changes in wages in the upper-tail of the distribution. The residual effects of the aggregate
contributions account for a relatively small proportion of the total changes in wages in all
the estimated quantiles. This implies that the estimated model works reasonably well to
explain the recent changes in Korean wage distribution.
The final four columns of Table 4.2 measure the contribution of workers’ characteristics
such as education, union status, age and sex. As shown in the literature, the number of years
of schooling and union status are clearly correlated with individual’s unobserved skills. This
makes the marginal effects from quantile regression biased and inconsistent. The Oaxaca
decomposition method deals with workers unobserved heterogeneity under the assumption
that workers unobserved skills remain the same over the two time period we consider. By
taking the difference of the wages for similar types of workers in two time periods gives
consistent estimates of the impact of covariates as long as the above assumption holds.
As shown the estimated effects of education are positive and monotonic throughout the
wage distribution function. The difference between the impact of education for the 90th
and 50th quantile implies that had the distribution of education remained the same as in
1998, the 90/50 wage gap would have increased by 5.8%. As shown the 90/50 wage gap
has actually increased about 57.2% during the period 1998-2007. Thus, observed increase
in education level contributes about 10% of the increase in wage inequality. Similarly, the
difference between the impact of education for the middle and lower tail of the distribution
shows that the increase in the level of schooling can not explain why the 50/10 wage gap
has increased about 9% during the same time period.
There exists an extensive literature on the impact of declining unionization on Korean
wage inequality. By using the fixed effect estimators, Cho (2008) shows that during the
period 1998-2006 union wage premium is about 2.1% and argues that in Korea union wage
premium is relatively small compared to the other developed nations because only 20% of the
total small size firms which consist of less than 100 employees have union workers. Moreover,
the unionization rate also changes relatively less compared to the other developed countries.
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Kim (2008) shows that during the period 1988-1997 union wage premium was about 1.7%,
however it increases to 5.1 % during the period 1998-2009.
An important caveat to interpret the marginal effects of union status in the previous
studies is that union and nonunion workers differ in terms of their unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 4.2 decomposition results can be interpreted as had the unionization rate remained
the same in 1998, the 90/50 wage gap would have decreased by 2.3% and the 50/10 wage
gap would have increased by 0.6%. Thus declining unionization can explain about 5% of
the increase in 90/50 wage gap and has almost no impact to the changes in the 50/10 wage
gap. Yoo (1998) finds that declining unionization increases wage inequality approximately
3% during the period 1988-1993.
Kim (2008) and Kim et al. (2004) argue that declining unionization has higher impact
on Korean wage distribution in post financial crisis because in the bargain process, unions
had to accept easier termination of employment for higher wages due to the revision of labor
law. As shown in Table 4.1, the unionization rate falls by 2.5% during the period 1998-2007
and 2.4% of those union workers are from the middle and low skilled occupations. As a
result, the decline in unionization rate mainly affects the medium and low skilled workers
and that leads to a small increase in the 90/50 wage gap and has almost no impact on the
50/10 wage gap during the period 1998-2007.
4.4 Conclusion
By applying the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition method on the Korean labor
market data for the period 1998-2007, we find that both the composition and wage structure
effects contribute in the same direction to the changes in the upper and lower-tail wage
inequality. Observed increase in education level can explain about 10% of the increase in
upper-tail wage inequality because returns from education have increased about 7 to 10%
in the upper-tail while staying roughly same in the lower half of the distribution. Declining
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unionization can explain about 5% of the increase in 90/50 wage gap and does not have
much impact on the 50/10 wage gap because unionization rate declines marginally in Korea
during the period 1998-2007.
Currently this income (wage) inequality issue is a topic of hot debate among policy-
makers in Korea. Korean government has adopted some policies for redistribution, such as
consumption tax, income tax, and transfer income; however, the effectiveness of these policies
remains controversial. By providing a better understanding of previous wage inequality that
incorporates the role of various individual characteristics at various quartiles, this study can
serve as a meaningful base study for the sustainable welfare or redistribution policies that
Korean policy-makers are currently seeking.
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APPENDIX A
Chapter III : Appendix
A.0.1 Condition for the marginal surviving firm to neither export nor offshore
For the marginal firm to not export, it must be the case that
((
σ
σ − 1
)
cn
ϕ̂
)1−σ
(
τ 1−σA
σ
) < fx
That is, even if the firm gets the lowest possible draw of exporting variable cost txv which is
1, it still cannot cover the fixed cost of exporting, and hence it doesn’t export.
What about offshoring? In order for this firm to not offshore it must be the case that
((
σ
σ − 1
)
co(ψ)|to=1
ϕ̂
)1−σ
P σ−ηL
σ
< f + fo.
That is, even if the firm gets the most favorable draw of to which is 1, it still doesn’t find it
worthwhile to offshore. Since (3.9) is satisfied for this firm, the above can be written as
(
cn
co(ψ)|to=1
)σ−1
f < f + fo. (A.1)
So, if the above condition is satisfied, then the marginal existing firm doesn’t offshore.
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Can this firm do both if either of them alone is not possible? This will not be possible if
((
σ
σ − 1
)
co(ψ)|to=1
ϕ̂
)1−σ
(
P σ−ηL+τ 1−σA
σ
)− f − fo − fx < 0
Substituting out P σ−η using (3.9) the above can be written as
(
cn
co(ψ)|to=1
)σ−1
f − f − fo +
((
σ
σ − 1
)
co(ψ)|to=1
ϕ̂
)1−σ
τ 1−σA
σ
− fx < 0
In light of (A.1) a sufficient condition for the above is that
((
σ
σ − 1
)
co(ψ)|to=1
ϕ̂
)1−σ
(
τ 1−σA
σ
)− fx < 0
We know that the firm cannot export when it is not offshoring:
((
σ
σ−1
)
cn
ϕ̂
)1−σ
( τ
1−σA
σ
) < fx.
In order for this firm to not export when offshoring a sufficient condition is
((
σ
σ−1
) co(ψ)|to=1
ϕ̂
)1−σ
( τ
1−σA
σ
) <
fx. Since if this condition is satisfied, the condition
((
σ
σ−1
)
cn
ϕ̂
)1−σ
( τ
1−σA
σ
) < fx is satisfied
as well. Therefore, the condition needed for the marginal firm to neither export nor offshore
is
(
cn
co(ψ)|to=1
)σ−1
f < f + fo;((
σ
σ − 1
)
co(ψ)|to=1
ϕ̂
)1−σ
(
τ 1−σA
σ
) < fx.
Suppose A is proportional to the domestic market size: A = µP σ−ηL, where µ is the pro-
portionality factor. Now, the second condition above becomes
(
cn
co(ψ)|to=1
)σ−1
µτ 1−σf < fx
That is, the common exporting costs (τ and fx) should be sufficiently large so that even
if the firm gets the best possible draw of firm specific trading cost, it still doesn’t want to
export.
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A.0.2 Existence proof
We show that dΠ
dϕ̂
< 0. Taking the derivative of (3.11) with respect to ϕ̂ obtain
dΠ
dϕ̂
= −
∫
to
∫
tx
pi(ψ|ϕ̂ , ϕ̂; τ, λ)g(ψ)dtxdto +
∞∫
ϕ̂
∫
to
∫
tx
∂pi(ψ, ϕ̂; τ, λ)
∂ϕ̂
g(ψ)dtxdtodϕ, (A.2)
where ψ|ϕ̂ = (ϕ̂, tx, to). Next, note that pi(ψ|ϕ̂ , ϕ̂; τ, λ) = 0 for all tx, to because a firm
with productivity ϕ̂ neither offshores nor exports and the net profits are zero for this firm
by construction. Moreover ∂pi(ψ,ϕ̂;τ,λ)
∂ϕ̂
< 0 as can be easily verified from (3.10). Therefore,
dΠ
dϕ̂
< 0, and hence the equilibrium exists if the initial conditions are correct. We need Π > fe
when ϕ̂→ ϕmin and Π < fe when ϕ̂→∞.
A.0.3 Impact of changes in τ and λ on ϕ̂
The free entry condition (3.11) implies
dΠ
dτ
≡ ∂Π
∂ϕ̂
dϕ̂
dτ
+
∂Π
∂τ
= 0
From the expression for Π in (3.11)
∂Π
∂τ
≡
∞∫
ϕ̂
∫
to
∫
tx
∂pi(ψ, ϕ̂; τ, λ)
∂τ
g(ψ)dtxdtodϕ < 0
The inequality above follows from the fact that ∂pi(ψ,ϕ̂;τ,λ)
∂τ
≤ 0 (easily verified from (3.10))
for any ψ. Since (A.2) yields ∂Π
∂ϕ̂
< 0, we get
dϕ̂
dτ
= −∂Π
∂τ
/
∂Π
∂ϕ̂
< 0
Similarly,
dΠ
dλ
≡ ∂Π
∂ϕ̂
dϕ̂
dλ
+
∂Π
∂λ
= 0
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Again, from the expression for Π in (3.11)
∂Π
∂λ
≡
∞∫
ϕ̂
∫
to
∫
tx
∂pi(ψ, ϕ̂; τ, λ)
∂λ
g(ψ)dtxdtodϕ < 0
Once again, the inequality above follows from the fact that ∂pi(ψ,ϕ̂;τ,λ)
∂λ
≤ 0 for any ψ as is
easily verified from (3.10). Therefore,
dϕ̂
dλ
= −∂Π
∂λ
/
∂Π
∂ϕ̂
< 0
A.0.4 Expressions for Employment
Given the unit cost for Y in (3.5), Shephard’s lemma implies that the requirement of
L per unit of output for a firm with productivity ϕv and offshoring status s is given by
αρcs(ψ)
ρ/ϕv, for s ∈ {n, o}. Therefore, Ls(ψ) = (αρcs(ψ)ρ/ϕ) z(ψv). Next, we use (3.2) for
z(ψ) to get Ls(ψ) = (α
ρcs(ψ)
ρ/ϕ) p(ψ)−σP σ−ηL as the labor requirement to meet domestic
demand. Lastly, substitute out p(ψ) and P using equation (3.6) to obtain
Lds(ψ) = α
ρ (σ − 1) (cs(ψ)ρ−σ)(ϕcn
ϕ̂
)σ−1
f for s ∈ {n, o}
For exporting firms, the export demand is zf (ψ) = p(ψ)−σA =
((
σ
σ−1
)
τtxcs(ψ)
ϕ
)−σ
A,
therefore, they need to ship τtxz
f (ψ), and hence we get the following labor requirement for
exports
Lxs(ψ) = α
ρ
(
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
c
s
(ψ)ρ−σ (τtx)
1−σ ϕσ−1A
Combining the above, we obtain the expression for employment presented in the text.
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Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.1: Firm Boundary by Sourcing Mode
Figure 2.2: Model prediction : Antra`s & Helpman (2004)
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Figure 2.3: Multiple Sourcing in Korean Manufacturing Industry from 2006-2010
Figure 2.4: Results of Binary Dependent Variable Construction
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Figure 4.1: The Trend of Wage Inequality during 1980-2012
Source : Korean Ministry of Employment and Labor
77
Figure 4.2: Changes in the Korean Log(wage) Density functions and Machado and Mata (2005) Decomposition Method Results
Gaussian Kernel function is assumed to plot the probability wage distribution function. To estimate the optimal bandwidth, Botev, Grotowski and Kroese (2010) method is used.
For aggregate contributions we use Oaxaca Decomposition, Fα(wt=1)− Fα(wt=0) = [Fα(wt=1)− Fα(wt=1;xt=0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Covariates
+ [Fα(wt=1;xt=0)− Fα(wt=0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Coefficients
+ Residual and individual
covariates contributions are measured as, Fα(wt=1)− Fα
(
wt=1;x?t=1, xt=0
)
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of explanatory variables
Mean
Standard Deviation
N n
Overall Between Within
K
L 3.452 1.897 1.787 0.699 27,499 7,298
H
L 0.193 0.054 0.044 0.034 27,499 7,298
R&D
Sales 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.007 27,499 7,298
Adv.
Sales 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.004 27,499 7,298
TFP 230.52 619.77 588.25 223.89 26,872 7,181
Size 276.16 1712.3 1503.3 148.50 27,499 7,298
1 K/L indicates industry capital intensity defined as the ratio of total tangible asset to the total wage
bill. H/L indicates industry managemenl intensity defined as the ratio of total management workers
to the total employment. R&D/Sales indicates industry R&D intensity defined as the ratio of R&D
expenditure to the total sales. Adv./Sales indicates advertising intensity defined as the ratio of total
advertisement cost over total sales. TFP is total factor productivity obtained by Levinshon-Petrin
method, Size is the firm level total number of employment
2 In the estimation, natural logarithm is taken to all variables.
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Table 2.2: Hypothesis 1 : Ownership Choice
Vertical Integration Outsourcing
Overall FDI DI Overall FO DO
log(KL ) 0.518
**** 0.546** 0.311* -0.235* 0.057 -0.239*
(0.172) (0.223) (0.174) (0.125) (0.413) (0.123)
log(KL ) 0.519
*** 0.550** 0.311* -0.228* 0.062 -0.232*
with control (0.172) (0.225) (0.174) (0.125) (0.414) (0.123)
Obs. 4826 2161 4238 8323 608 8360
# of Group 1107 501 963 1938 145 1942
1 Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors obatained from boostrapping with 399 replications.
2 ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
3 FDI dependent variable is a binary variable indicating the corresponding observation has largest amount of foreign
sourcing from related party. DI dependent variable is a binary variable indicating the corresponding observation has
largest amount of domestic sourcing from related party. Vertical integration dependent variable is constructed by com-
bining both FDI and DI dependent variable. FO dependent variable is a binary variable indicating the corresponding
observation has largest amount of foreign sourcing from unrelated party. DO dependent variable is a binary variable
indicating the corresponding observation has largest amount of domestic sourcing from unrelated party. Outsourcing
dependent variable is constructed by combining both FO and DO dependent variable.
4 Firm level control is the firm size.
4 Fixed Effect Logit estimation is applied. Raw coefficients from the statistical software are reported.
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Table 2.3: Hypothesis 1 : Ownership Choice
Vertical Integration Outsourcing
Overall FDI DI Overall FO DO
log(KL ) 0.557
*** 0.575** 0.352* -0.229* 0.123 -0.304**
(0.185) (0.248) (0.184) (0.122) (0.427) (0.130)
log(HL ) 0.151 0.178 0.065 -0.293
** 0.410 -0.258**
(0.152) (0.229) (0.159) (0.130) (0.468) (0.120)
log(R&DSales ) 0.195
** 0.147 0.109 0.054 -0.096 0.055
(0.093) (0.128) (0.097) (0.071) (0.298) (0.069)
log( Adv.Sales ) -0.104
* -0.231*** 0.037 -0.014 -0.052 -0.008
(0.062) (0.086) (0.062) (0.045) (0.154) (0.047)
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 4826 2161 4238 8320 608 8357
# of Group 1107 501 963 1938 145 1942
1 Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors obatained from boostrapping with 399 replications.
2 ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
3 Fixed Effect Logit estimation is applied. Raw coefficients from the statistical software are reported.
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Table 2.4: Hypothesis 2 : TFP effects on the FDI choice
High Captal Intensity Industry
Above mean Above 50th Above 75th
log(TFP) 0.518** 0.383m 0.563*** 0.408* 0.556** 0.480*
(0.230) (0.236) (0.216) (0.214) (0.259) (0.260)
log(TFP) 0.528** 0.406* 0.570*** 0.425** 0.573** 0.515**
with control (0.231) (0.239) (0.217) (0.216) (0.256) (0.260)
log(TFP) 0.786** 1.695* 0.772** 1.856** 0.677* 1.352
with two step (0.372) (0.914) (0.321) (0.842) (0.386) (0.981)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 779(480) 779(480) 994(611) 994(611) 572(349) 572(349)
# of Group 194(139) 194(139) 242(173) 242(173) 147(103) 147(103)
Low Captal Intensity Industry
Below mean Below 50th Below 25th
log(TFP) 0.378** 0.286* 0.349** 0.258 0.427 0.328
(0.157) (0.170) (0.173) (0.184) (0.265) (0.284)
log(TFP) 0.361** 0.302* 0.319* 0.264 0.374 0.326
with control (0.160) (0.173) (0.175) (0.189) (0.269) (0.296)
log(TFP) 0.198 0.288 0.121 -0.040 0.374 -0.785
with two step (0.290) (0.767) (0.322) (0.939) (0.269) (1.364)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 1198(728) 1198(728) 996(603) 996(603) 571(328) 571(328)
# of Group 295(207) 295(207) 248(174) 248(174) 147(96) 147 (96)
1 Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors obatained from boostrap 399 replications.
2 ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. m denotes marginal significance within 10.5%
3 The first and second row for each side(Top and Bottom) contains estimation results of equation (2). The third row for each side(Top
and Bottom) contains second stage estimation results of equation (4).
4 The numbers of observations and groups in the two stage estimation are reported in the parenthesis.
5 Fixed Effect Logit estimation is applied. Raw coefficients from the statistical software are reported.
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Table 2.5: Hypothesis 2 : TFP effects on the Foreign outsourcing choice
High Captal Intensity Industry
Above mean Above 50th Above 75th
log(TFP) -0.134 -0.151 -0.234 -0.222 -0.624 -0.889
(0.496) (0.779) (0.571) (0.757) (0.814) (2.620)
log(TFP) -0.176 -0.257 -0.279 -0.310 -0.919 -1.373a
with control (0.554) (0.892) (0.619) (0.897) (1.154) (1.158)
log(TFP) -1.142 -5.336a -1.331a -5.881a -2.097a -18.345a
with control (2.246) (4.125) (1.431) (3.831) (1.872) (13.596)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 117(50) 117(50) 132(33) 132(33) 72(58) 72(58)
# of Group 30(15) 30(15) 33(10) 33(10) 18(17) 18(17)
Low Captal Intensity Industry
Below mean Below 50th Below 25th
log(TFP) 0.254 0.257 0.282 0.276 0.250 0.111
(0.303) (0.308) (0.297) (0.303) (0.373) (0.397)
log(TFP) 0.320 0.293 0.355 0.317 0.353 0.138
with control (0.305) (0.315) (0.296) (0.304) (0.392) (0.409)
log(TFP) 1.371** 2.403 1.403** 2.519* 1.537** 3.197
with control (0.617) (1.483) (0.582) (1.421) (0.821) (2.146)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 416(235) 416(235) 403(228) 403(228) 258(144) 258(144)
# of Group 104(67) 104(67) 101(65) 101(65) 67(43) 67(43)
1 Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors obatained from boostrap 399 replications.
a In the corresponding cell, standard error is reported as the failure of boostrapping.
2 ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
3 The first and second row for each side(Top and Bottom) contains estimation results of equation (2). The third row for each
side(Top and Bottom) contains second stage estimation results of equation (4).
4 The numbers of observations and groups in the two stage estimation are reported in the parenthesis.
5 Fixed Effect Logit estimation is applied. Raw coefficients from the statistical software are reported.
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Table 2.6: Hypothesis 2 : TFP effects on the Offshoring choice
High Captal Intensity Industry
Above mean Above 50th Above 75th
log(TFP) 0.504** 0.386* 0.529*** 0.387* 0.442* 0.339
(0.223) (0.219) (0.204) (0.203) (0.236) (0.257)
log(TFP) 0.513** 0.400* 0.535*** 0.398** 0.457* 0.361
with control (0.224) (0.221) (0.204) (0.202) (0.234) (0.259)
log(TFP) 0.897** 1.373 0.843*** 1.480* 0.602 0.806
with two step (0.379) (0.864) (0.323) (0.789) (0.404) (0.917)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 802(489) 802(489) 1028(628) 1028(628) 580(355) 580(355)
# of Group 202(142) 202(142) 252(178) 252(178) 151(105) 151(105)
Low Captal Intensity Industry
Below mean Below 50th Below 25th
log(TFP) 0.427** 0.338* 0.410** 0.322* 0.531* 0.358
(0.171) (0.181) (0.173) (0.178) (0.281) (0.277)
log(TFP) 0.420** 0.360* 0.399** 0.337* 0.526* 0.382
with control (0.173) (0.184) (0.171) (0.178) (0.282) (0.274)
log(TFP) 0.596** 1.240* 0.569** 1.032 0.651 1.055
with two step (0.260) (0.652) (0.289) (0.698) (0.451) (0.996)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 1397(855) 1397(855) 1182(721) 1182(721) 671(404) 671(404)
# of Group 341(243) 341(243) 292(218) 292(218) 171(120) 171(120)
1 Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors obatained from boostrap 399 replications.
2 ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
3 The first and second row for each side(Top and Bottom) contains estimation results of equation (2). The third row for each side(Top
and Bottom) contains second stage estimation results of equation (4).
4 The numbers of observations and groups in the two stage estimation are reported in the parenthesis.
5 Fixed Effect Logit estimation is applied. Raw coefficients from the statistical software are reported.
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Table 2.7: Hypothesis 3 : Discrete Duration Analysis
Full Sample
High Capital Intensity Low Capital Intensity
Above Avg. Above 50th Above 75th Below Avg. Below 50th Below 25th
log(TFP) 0.198** 0.170* 0.254*** 0.158 0.224* 0.099 -0.072
(0.078) (0.096) (0.081) (0.139) (0.124) (0.150) (0.179)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 7880 3020 4726 1708 4860 3154 2008
1 Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.
2 ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
3 The base sample consists of continuing domestic outsourcing firms from 2006 to 2010.
4 Dependent variable is the year of FDI occurence.
5 Logit estimation is applied. Raw coefficients from the statistical software are reported.
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Table 2.8: Participation Behavior : Ownership Choice
Vertical Integration Outsourcing
Overall FDI DI Overall FO DO
log(KL ) 0.538
*** 0.698*** 0.264* 0.030 0.178 0.039
(0.143) (0.184) (0.157) (0.137) (0.276) (0.142)
log(KL ) 0.534
*** 0.698*** 0.267* 0.038 0.165 0.049
with control (0.143) (0.184) (0.157) (0.137) (0.274) (0.144)
Obs. 5605 3322 5686 6496 1702 6578
# of Group 1279 754 1296 1528 396 1548
1 Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors obatained from boostrapping with 399 replications.
2 ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
3 Fixed Effect Logit estimation is applied. Raw coefficients from the statistical software are reported.
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Table 2.9: TFP effects on the FDI Participation
High Captal Intensity Industry
Above mean Above 50th Above 75th
log(TFP) 0.725** 0.549** 0.695*** 0.462** 0.496* 0.382
(0.284) (0.276) (0.224) (0.218) (0.255) (0.264)
log(TFP) 0.759** 0.605** 0.717*** 0.502** 0.524* 0.435
with control (0.300) (0.297) (0.235) (0.233) (0.273) (0.290)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 1078 1078 1371 1371 760 760
# of Group 268 268 331 331 193 193
Low Captal Intensity Industry
Below mean Below 50th Below 25th
log(TFP) 0.208 0.142 0.221 0.177 0.165 0.122
(0.135) (0.140) (0.151) (0.154) (0.234) (0.235)
log(TFP) 0.192 0.162 0.212 0.210 0.153 0.158
with control (0.135) (0.138) (0.150) (0.152) (0.236) (0.231)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 1920 1920 1632 1632 841 841
# of Group 462 462 399 399 212 212
1 Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors obatained from boostrap 399 replications.
2 ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. m denotes marginal significance within 10.5%
3 The first and second row for each side(Top and Bottom) contains estimation results of equation (2) with partici-
pation dependent variable.
4 Fixed Effect Logit estimation is applied. Raw coefficients from the statistical software are reported.
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Table 2.10: TFP effects on Foreign Outsourcing Participation
High Captal Intensity Industry
Above mean Above 50th Above 75th
log(TFP) 0.665* 0.642* 0.462 0.453 0.427 0.426
(0.342) (0.359) (0.312) (0.327) (0.362) (0.399)
log(TFP) 0.635* 0.597 0.440 0.418 0.365 0.351
with control (0.362) (0.374) (0.316) (0.329) (0.373) (0.405)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 395 395 520 520 282 282
# of Group 99 99 128 128 73 73
Low Captal Intensity Industry
Below mean Below 50th Below 25th
log(TFP) 0.009 0.056 0.053 0.096 0.043 0.083
(0.185) (0.185) (0.202) (0.203) (0.248) (0.254)
log(TFP) 0.098 0.149 0.188 0.229 0.278 0.333
with control (0.192) (0.197) (0.212) (0.222) (0.263) (0.275)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 1096 1096 964 964 591 591
# of Group 265 265 236 236 153 153
1 Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors obatained from boostrap 399 replications.
2 ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
3 The first and second row for each side(Top and Bottom) contains estimation results of equation (2) with partici-
pation dependent variable.
4 Fixed Effect Logit estimation is applied. Raw coefficients from the statistical software are reported.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation) of Korean Labor and Income
Panel Survey Data for All and by Male and Female
All Male Female
Variable Stats 1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007
Log Wage Mean 7.329 7.493 7.309 7.750 7.368 7.123
(Monthly) SD 0.484 0.621 0.476 0.642 0.498 0.339
Female Mean 0.339 0.409
SD 0.474 0.492
Married Mean 0.811 0.649 0.862 0.793 0.712 0.440
SD 0.392 0.477 0.345 0.405 0.453 0.497
Household size Mean 3.687 3.642 3.760 3.688 3.546 3.576
SD 1.091 0.762 1.031 0.721 1.188 0.813
Education Mean 11.553 10.860 11.940 10.375 10.801 11.559
SD 3.172 3.789 2.775 4.140 3.717 3.086
Age Mean 40.227 45.674 40.990 49.740 38.739 39.811
SD 10.655 12.153 11.535 10.757 8.496 11.648
Experience Mean 22.673 28.814 23.051 33.365 21.938 22.252
SD 13.060 14.220 13.614 12.400 11.878 14.115
Union Workers(%)
All Occ 8.950 6.455 12.710 10.201 1.662 1.054
Unskilled Occ 8.458 6.041 12.188 9.744 1.228 0.702
Skilled Occ 0.492 0.414 0.522 0.457 0.434 0.351
No of Obs 4,106 5,563 2,713 3,285 1,393 2,278
The skilled occupation category is consists of (i) Legislators, Senior officials
and Managers (ii) Professionals (iii) Associate Professionals and Technicians
(iv) Service Workers (v) Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Workers and
the unskilled occupation is the combination of (i) Clerks (ii) Sales Workers (iii)
Craft and related Trade Workers (iv) Plant, Machine Operators and Assemblers
(v) Elementary Occupations.
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Table 4.2: Decomposition of Wage Distribution Function by Using Machado and Mata (2005) Decomposition Method
Marginals Aggregate Contributions Individual Covariates
2007 1998 Change Composition Effect Wage Structure Effect Residuals Education Age Union Sex
10th quant. 6.787 6.773 0.013 -0.057 0.072 -0.002 0.032 -0.007 0.022 0.012
(-0.003,0.030) (-0.059,-0.054) (0.054,0.089) (0.030,0.033) (-0.008,-0.009) (0.020,0.023) (0.011,0.013)
-4.277 5.413 -0.135 2.385 -0.528 1.625 0.890
25th quant. 7.053 6.984 0.069 0.056 0.018 -0.005 0.038 -0.011 0.033 0.026
(0.064,0.073) (0.053,0.060) (0.013,0.022) (0.037,0.039) (-0.010,-0.012) (0.031,0.034) (0.025,0.028)
0.819 0.255 -0.074 0.551 -0.160 0.475 0.383
50th quant. 7.347 7.245 0.102 0.010 0.086 0.006 0.035 0.016 0.028 0.024
(0.099,0.105) (0.006,0.013) (0.083,0.090) (0.033,0.037) (0.015,0.017) (0.026,0.030) (0.023,0.026)
0.096 0.849 0.056 0.346 0.158 0.274 0.239
75th quant. 7.722 7.688 0.034 0.055 0.010 -0.030 0.078 0.007 0.010 0.036
(0.018,0.050) (0.046,0.064) (-0.003,0.022) (0.075,0.080) (0.005,0.009) (0.008,0.012) (0.034,0.038)
1.607 0.284 -0.890 2.276 0.209 0.300 1.068
90th quant. 8.619 7.945 0.674 0.564 0.095 0.016 0.093 0.004 0.005 0.036
(0.671,0.677) (0.558,0.570) (0.092,0.098) (0.090,0.095) (0.003,0.005) (0.003,0.007) (0.035,0.039)
0.836 0.141 0.023 0.137 0.006 0.007 0.054
Scale 0.091 0.097 -0.006 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.001
(-0.008,-0.004) (-0.002,0.001) (-0.003,-0.001) (0.003,0.005) (0.000,0.001) (-0.004,-0.0002) (0.000,0.002)
0.053 0.338 0.609 -0.720 -0.007 5.641 -0.116
Skewness 0.657 -0.054 0.711 0.279 0.540 -0.109 -0.005 -0.005 -0.055 0.000
(0.697,0.726) (0.267,0.291) (0.514,0.568) (-0.006,-0.004) (-0.006,-0.004) (-0.057,-0.052) (-0.002,0.002)
0.393 0.760 -0.153 0.085 -0.007 -0.077 0.000
Kurtosis 3.149 2.833 0.316 0.137 -1.410 1.589 -0.044 -0.007 0.089 -0.040
(0.268,0.365) (0.090,0.185) (-1.542,-1.282) (-0.049,0.040) (-0.008,-0.007) (0.083,0.094) (-0.045,-0.035)
0.435 -4.467 5.032 -0.141 -0.023 0.282 -0.014
Gini Coeff 0.045 0.037 0.008 0.009 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.007,0.009) (0.008,0010) (-0.003,-0.001) (0.000,0.002) (0.000,0.001) (-0.002,-0.003) (0.000,0.002)
1.050 -0.264 0.214 0.141 -0.001 -0.071 0.047
The first row of each block is the point estimated in the change in the attribute of the density, explained by the indicator factor; the second row is the 95% confidence interval for that change and
the third row is percentage of the total change explained by the indicator factor.
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Globalization (Fall 2013, Fall 2012)
Economic Ideas and Issues (Spring 2011)
Presentations Department of Economics, Syracuse University
• Trade Breakfast Fall 2014, Spring 2014, Fall 2013, April 2013
• Econometrics Lunch Mar 2012
Conference
Participation
New York Camp Econometrics April 2011, 2012, 2013
• Invited and participated
Software Skills • Eviews, Gauss, LATEX, Matlab, Microsoft Office, R, SAS, Stata
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Student Awards • Gerald B. Daphna Cramer International Studies Research Assistantship,
Syracuse University Sept 2014 to current
• Study Abroad Scholarship, Konkuk University Sept 2005
• Merit-based Scholarship, Konkuk University Feb 2000
Military
Experience
Republic of Korea Air Force Mar 2001 to Sept 2003
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